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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF LOCAL RULES
Justin Sevier*
Many legal rules are based on hunches about human behavior that
have not been tested empirically. A behavioral analysis of these rules
can illuminate whether they work as policy makers intended or whether
they have unforeseen, systematically negative effects. Behavioral analyses of legal rules, unfortunately, are in short supply. This is particularly
true with respect to local procedural rules that govern the everyday operation of trials and are left to the discretion of trial courts.
This Article begins to fill that gap by empirically examining one of
these local procedural rules: the one allowing jurors to take notes during
trial. Intuitively, few would question the practice of jury note taking.
Permitting, even encouraging, jurors to keep track of evidence seems like
an obvious way to ensure the fidelity of verdicts, especially as trials and
evidence become increasingly complex; however, an empirical test of
note-taking reveals that the intuition may be wrong.
More specifically, this Article reports the results from an original
experiment that evaluated whether note-taking, under certain circumstances, can affect trial outcomes in unexpected ways. Drawing on literature from behavioral law and economics, this experiment demonstrated
that jury note-taking can exacerbate a phenomenon known as “vividness
bias,” which is the extent to which vivid information affects social judgment independent of its probative value. This surprising finding has implications for the ways in which heterogeneous, local procedural rules
affect the transparency, equity, and accuracy of jury verdicts. And it
suggests that there is a compelling need for additional empirical testing
of the behavioral intuitions behind procedural rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Rules that govern the everyday operation of jury trials are the neglected stepchildren of law review literature. Legal academia has been
largely silent in examining what types of effects local procedural rules,
both formal and informal, might have on substantive legal outcomes.
Behavioral studies in the last few decades establish that small contextual cues can have significant substantive impacts on people’s decisions.1 Yet the substantive impact of contextual cues in one of the most
important, discrete, and regulated of contexts—the courtroom—remains
essentially unstudied. This Article explains how recent behavioral and
cognitive findings suggest that local court rules, which can affect contextual decision making in the courtroom, may have a much deeper impact
on substantive justice than is appreciated and are thus worthy of further
legal and empirical study. As a jumpstart to empirical work in this area,
this Article presents a study measuring the ways in which one apparently
minor rule—whether jurors may take notes—can have a substantive im1

See infra Part I.A.
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pact on how juries reach verdicts. The Article concludes that, minor as
they may seem, local court rules can have important substantive implications for how courts dispense justice.
Local procedural rules take many shapes. They govern formalistic
issues, including the filing of legal briefs submitted to judges and the
format of their contents,2 as well as several important aspects of jury
trials, including the use of demonstrative evidence, the amount of time
parties may spend questioning witnesses, and the length and substance of
arguments before the jury.3
Some of the most interesting local procedural rules are the “jury
trial innovations” of the past twenty years.4 These innovations are
largely left to the discretion of individual trial judges to implement, and
both theoretical exploration and empirical examination of their aggregate
effects are sparse. Perhaps this is because many courts assume that these
rules will have a positive effect on trial outcomes and will lead to more
accurate judgments. However, these rules, over which there is no clear
oversight, may not function in practice in the ways policy makers predict
and actually could have systematic negative effects.
Behavioral law and economics studies have identified a variety of
cognitive biases to which triers of fact are prone when deciding legal
2 See, e.g., 19TH JUD. CIR. CT. LAKE CNTY., ILL. R. 2.01 (governing motions generally
and notice); MUSKINGUM, OHIO CNTY. CT. R. § 10, R. 5 (governing the submission of briefs);
MILWAUKEE CNTY., WIS. CIR. CT. R. 3.6 (governing the filing of papers).
3 See, e.g., L.A. SUPER. CT. LOCAL R. 3.131 (prohibiting counsel’s use of chalkboard
and paper without trial judge consent). See also FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (mandating judicial
oversight by the individual trial judge of evidentiary presentations for the purpose of trial
economy); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(h) (authorizing judges to issue time limits on trial proceedings);
Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court discretion to set
reasonable limits); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1171–72 (7th Cir.
1983) (upholding trial judge’s twenty-six-day time limit for each party to present its case-inchief); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 13–14 (D. Conn. 1977) (recommending time
limits).
4 These trial innovations include: allowing jurors to take notes; allowing jurors to ask
questions of trial witnesses during trial proceedings; allowing jurors to discuss the evidence
with each other before they formally deliberate; allowing attorneys to make interim comments
on the evidence during lengthy trials to “sum up” witnesses’ testimony; furnishing substantive
legal instructions to juries before the presentation of evidence; allowing jurors to watch prerecorded testimony; and revamping the language of jury instructions. See generally JURY
TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997); Martin J. Bourgeois et al.,
Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of Preinstruction and Deliberations on Decisions and
Evidence Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58 (1995); Neil P. Cohen, The
Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681 (2000); B. Michael Dann et al., Can Jury
Trial Innovations Improve Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence?, 90 JUDICATURE 153, 155
(2007); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an
Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions
into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449 (2006); Nicole L. Mott, The
Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the Question,” 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003).
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cases.5 There is very little research demonstrating to what extent procedural rules exacerbate or inhibit these biases. More specifically, there is
no research on whether local procedural rules, which are heterogeneous
and vary significantly within jurisdictions, exacerbate or inhibit these
biases.
This Article begins to fill that gap by empirically examining
whether one local procedural rule—jury note-taking—has substantive effects on trial outcomes. It then explores whether the best policy is to
leave the decision to local courts or to standardize these rules instead.
Part I of the Article reviews the behavioral economics literature relevant to these local procedural rules and then briefly discusses the pertinent rules. Part II focuses on the legal history and existing empirical
scholarship relevant to the practice of allowing jurors to take notes during trials. Part III describes an original experimental study that suggests
that note-taking can lead to biased legal judgments under certain conditions. Specifically, a phenomenon known as “vividness bias” can systematically affect the legal decisions of jury members who take notes
during trial. Part IV discusses the implications of, and potential objections to, these results. It focuses on how biased judgments stemming
from the application of local procedural rules can affect the transparency,
equity, and accuracy of jurors’ substantive decisions. The Article concludes by calling for additional research. If, as this Article shows, local
procedural rules can have detrimental substantive impacts on legal decision-making, broader and more wide-reaching procedural rules—such as
federal pleading standards—may have even more dramatic implications
for substantive justice.
I. BACKGROUND
Procedural rules are created in three ways. Elected legislatures can
create formal, uniform rules, such the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and their state law counterparts.6 Other times, in interpreting procedural
rules, the judiciary creates additional substantive law that legal actors
must follow. For example, the United States Supreme Court’s Erie doc5 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002);
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the
Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J. 1 (2004); Reid Hastie & B. Wittenbrink, Heuristics for Applying
Laws to Facts, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (Gerg Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006);
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1489–1506 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Heuristics and
Biases in Specialized Judges: The Case of Bankruptcy Judges, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006);
W. Kip Viscusi, How do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26 (1999).
6 FED. R. CIV. P.; see also, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. P.; FL. R. CIV. P.; ILL. R. CIV. P.; N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L. & R.; TEX. R. CIV. P.
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trine mandates that a federal trial court sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law of the state in which the federal court is located7 and its
Iqbal doctrine radically has altered the manner in which parties substantively plead their claims in federal court.8 Finally, procedural rules can
be promulgated by individual courts and judges themselves through authority delegated to them by legislatures.9 These first two methods for
creating procedural rules apply broadly and uniformly to many legal actors at once and have been studied widely.10 Procedural rules promulgated by the third method, however, vary from court to court—and from
judge to judge—and have not been studied rigorously by legal academia.
Matters left to the discretion of individual trial courts run the gamut
from rules governing the form of documents filed in a trial court clerk’s
office11 to rules governing the actions of jurors during a trial.12 In contrast to uniform rules enacted by state and federal legislatures and uniform rules enacted by higher courts, these lower court rules are
heterogeneous. Further, this heterogeneity means that there is no consistent, elaborated principle for the selected choice of rule.
This heterogeneity and lack of consistent, elaborated principles for
these lower court rules raise important questions. First, why are certain
procedural matters left to the discretion of individual trial judges? Second, what are the characteristics of these procedural rules? Third, and
most importantly, when do these local court rules matter; do any of these
heterogeneous local procedural court rules substantively influence trial
outcomes?
7 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938); see also Semtek Int’l, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (interpreting Erie); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (same); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (same); Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (same).
8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see also Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset,
631 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2011) (interpreting Iqbal); Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110
(2d Cir. 2010) (same); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).
9 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (allowing “a district court, acting by a majority of its
district judges, [to] adopt and amend rules governing its practice”). For a fuller discussion of
this Rule, see infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining The Laws Of The Several States: Positivism
And Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997); Richard D. Freer, Some
Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998); Jack Goldsmith &
Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998). See
also Richard Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with
Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187 (2011); Suja Thomas, Oddball Iqbal
and Twombly in Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2011); Geoffrey C.
Westbrook, Evolutionary Pleading: Should Congress Override the Supreme Court’s Unnatural Selection in Ashcroft v. Iqbal to Prevent the Extinction of Civil Rights Cases?, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 205 (2010).
11 See supra note 2.
12 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(f) (governing juror discussions of evidence during trial).
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This third question raises a host of intriguing issues. It is wellknown that uniform procedural rules, through codification and judicial
pronouncement, have substantive effects on trial outcomes.13 In contrast,
local court rules, including rules of practice before individual judges, are
essentially unstudied. While robust behavioral and cognitive research
supports the conclusion that contextual cues affect substantive decisionmaking, almost no studies address whether local procedural rules, which
vary widely across trial courts, have substantive effects.
Further, if these rules do have substantive effects on legal outcomes,
it is not clear which types of local rules will most likely have substantive
effects. For example, rules implicating known biases that may affect juror perceptions of trial evidence may also implicate procedural due process concerns.14 Currently, local rules are set by individual courts with
virtually no empirical information as to their substantive impact and
without any academic or professional discussion of the appropriate legal
“level” (i.e., individual trial courts, higher courts, or the legislature) at
which those decisions should be made.
This Article attempts to jumpstart both research and discussion by
examining one of these local procedural rules: juror note-taking. Notetaking is an appropriate rule to examine for several reasons. Although
local procedural rules are understudied and undertheorized, juror notetaking is a somewhat more studied procedure. There are a number of
judicial opinions that discuss the procedure in at least some detail.15 Further, there is a robust psychological literature on note-taking generally16
and a more anemic but visible psycholegal literature on jury note-taking
13 See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure Distinction in Contemporary Corporate Litigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1 (2007); David M. Kinnecome,
Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745 (1999);
Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 827 (1993); see also supra note 10.
14 “Procedural [d]ue [p]rocess ‘delineates the constitutional limits on judicial, executive
and administrative enforcement of legislative or other governmental dictates or decisions . . . .’” Jenkins v. Hutton, 967 F.Supp. 277, 281 (S.D. Oh. 1997) (quoting LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7 at 664 (2d ed. 1988)). “[P]rocedural due process . . . defines what process a person must receive before being deprived of a life, liberty, or
property interest.” Id. (citing Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.2d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Legal
scholars have studied this “uncontroversial” doctrine at length. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 546 (Aspen Law & Business 3d ed., 2006);
see also Edward Erberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST’L
COMMENT. 339 (1987); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm:
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (2009); Martin H. Redish & William J.
Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the
Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877 (2009).
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 See infra Part II.B.1.
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in particular.17 The legal history and empirical scholarship allow us to
form hypotheses about whether a local procedural rule like jury notetaking can have unintended substantive effects on trial outcomes.
This Part will proceed in two sections. First, it will discuss how
contextual cues (for example, evidence framing) affect legal decisionmaking. Second, it will briefly discuss what local procedural rules are
and how they generally might interact with contextual cues to produce
substantive effects on trial outcomes. Later Parts of this Article will examine the literature on jury note-taking and will report the results of an
experiment which examines whether contextual cues lead to biased outcomes when jurors are allowed to take notes.
A. Contextual Cues and Legal Decision-making
Courts tend to assume that jurors are rational people who make
sound legal decisions based on facts they remember accurately and incorporate correctly.18 However, social science evidence demonstrates that
human beings are subject to a “slew of cognitive biases” that may call
into question the accuracy of those legal decisions.19
The decisions we make are remarkably susceptible to the context
and the manner in which certain options are presented to us. Seemingly
minor contextual cues affect decisions ranging from how altruistic we

17

See infra Part II.B.2.
See State v. Walker, 356 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. 1987) (“The law assumes that jurors
will follow their instructions and act in a rational fashion.”) (citing State v. McCraw, 268
S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 1980)); McCraw, 268 S.E.2d at 179 (holding that “a jury is presumed to be
rational”); accord Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 771, 775 n.20 (1986) (“[T]he law assumes that a factfinder should be rational . . . . .”).
19 Vito Rispo, The Power of “Framing Effects” and Other Cognitive Biases, ADSAVVY,
http://www.adsavvy.org/the-power-of-framing-effects-and-other-cognitive-biases/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011). Some of these biases include, but are not limited to, inattentional blindness,
blind-spot bias, better-than-average bias, introspection illusion, self-serving bias, confirmation
bias, attribution bias, representative fallacy, availability fallacy, anchoring fallacy, and the
hindsight bias. Id. See also Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research
Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83 (2008); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995).
18

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\21-2\CJP202.txt

298

CORNELL JOURNAL

unknown

OF

LAW

AND

Seq: 8

PUBLIC POLICY

23-JAN-12

11:34

[Vol. 21:291

are,20 to the way we stereotype other people,21 to what we choose to
eat.22
Furthermore, preferences for an outcome shift predictably when the
decision to be made is framed in different ways;23 the fields of psychology and economics refer to this phenomenon as a “framing effect.”24
Economists argue that framing effects violate standard economic accounts of human rationality.25 Rational decision-making, according to
economists, requires logical consistency and coherence across decisions,
regardless of the manner in which options are presented.26 For example,
if you prefer chicken over pasta, your preference for one over the other
should not deviate just because you learn that you could also have fish.27
The idea that our choices are not affected by the contexts that surround those choices has been challenged repeatedly by empirical data in
fields ranging from psychology to behavioral economics to advertising.28
In the first major article discussing framing effects, Nobel Prize-winning
psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky designed a simple but
elegant experiment demonstrating the concept in everyday reasoning.
Kahneman and Tversky gave people a choice between two options with
respect to a fictitious disease that would kill 600 people: (a) a program
that would save 200 people or (b) a program where the odds were 33%
20 Katie Liljenquist et al., The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and
Charity, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 381, 382 (2010) (finding that participants in clean-scented rooms
expressed greater interest in volunteering and donating money to charity than did control
participants).
21 Wendy van Rijswijk & Naomi Ellemers, Context Effects on the Application of Stereotype Content to Multiple Categorizable Targets, 28 PERSP. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90 (2002).
22 Patricia van Assema et al., Framing of Nutrition Education Messages in Persuading
Consumers of the Advantages of a Healthy Diet, 14 J. HUM. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 435
(2001).
23 In other words, the underlying decision is the same but the surface features of the
decision vary. See, e.g., Vicki L. Smith, How Jurors Make Decisions: The Value of Trial
Innovations, in JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 4, at 7, 16 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al.
eds., 1997).
24 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 5 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
25 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Preface to CHOICES, VALUES AND
FRAMES, supra note 24, at xiii–xvi; Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 491, 495–97 (2002); Shlomi Sher & Craig R. M. McKenzie, Framing Effects
and Rationality, in THE PROBABILISTIC MIND: PROSPECTS FOR BAYESIAN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
(Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford eds., 2008); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
26 See, e.g., Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making
in the Human Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684, 684 (2006); Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, supra note 25, at 453. This assumption is sometimes
referred to as “extensionality” or “invariance.” See Benedetto et al, supra at 684.
27 Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW & ECON. 61 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
28 See supra note 25.
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that 600 people would be saved and 67% that no one would be saved.29
These people tended to be risk averse and chose option A, even though
the expected value of both options is the same.30 Kahneman and Tversky then presented a second group of people with the same question, but
framed it differently.31 This time the programs were framed this way: (a)
a program that would allow 400 people to die or (b) a program where the
odds were 33% that nobody will die and 67% that 600 will die.32 This
time, even though these options were identical to the first set of options
in outcome (but framed differently), people overwhelmingly became
risk-seeking and chose option B;33 framing the issue as the certain death
of 400 people dramatically altered the ultimate decisions that the subjects
made.34
These framing effects, which change the contextual cues people use
to solve problems but do not change the underlying substantive information, became the backbone of Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect theory,” which involves the framing of economic losses and gains.35
Framing effects and contextual cues are not limited to decisions about
hypothetical diseases or financial matters; they also shape judgments that
have legal implications. For example, in a famous experiment on eyewitness identification, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus asked experimental
participants to watch films of traffic accidents.36 After watching the
films, participants answered questions related to the accidents which
were framed differently: some participants were asked to rate the speed
of one of the vehicles when it contacted the other vehicle while others
were asked to rate the speed of the vehicle when it smashed into the other
vehicle.37 Participants who were asked the vehicle’s speed when it
smashed into the other vehicle rated the speed of the vehicle significantly
higher than participants who were asked the vehicle’s speed when it con29 Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
supra note 23, at 453.
30 Id. One-third of 600 is 200, the same number of people who would be saved under
option A.
31 Id.
32 Id. Two-thirds of 600 is 400, the same number of people who would be saved under
option B.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979). Prospect theory states that people underweigh outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty.
This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to “risk aversion in choices involving
sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses.” In sum, anticipated losses hurt
more than their equivalent gains.
36 Elizabeth Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 8 PSYCHOL. TODAY 116, 117 (1974).
37 Id. at 119.
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tacted the other vehicle.38 In a related series of studies, similar tactics
resulted in eyewitnesses remembering erroneous details, such as smashed
glass at the intersection.39 Thus, contextual cues can affect not only our
judgments but also our memories for facts. These empirical findings
have obvious implications for trials by jury.
One specific type of framing effect that concerns juror decisionmaking is the vividness bias. Vividness bias describes a phenomenon by
which salient information—information that is concrete or invokes
mental imagery—can have a disproportionate impact on our memory for
facts and our attendant social judgments.40 For example, people perceive
highly salient causes of death such as shark attacks to be much more
likely to kill them than so-called “silent killers” such as heart disease,
though the opposite is true.41
When the vividness bias collides with jury decision-making, the result can bias trial outcomes. In a study examining the vividness bias in
mock jurors, psychologists varied the ways in which they framed the
prosecution and defense evidence in a mock trial.42 Sometimes mock
jurors were presented with very vivid prosecution evidence or very vivid
defense evidence.43 Mock jurors’ guilt judgments demonstrated that they
more easily recalled vivid evidence than pallid evidence, even though the
probative values of each description of evidence were the same.44
This study demonstrates a powerful application of Kahneman and
Tversky’s framing effects to the courtroom—one that has implications
for local procedural rules, like jury note-taking.45 Though it may appear
irrational, the way in which a decision is framed can greatly impact our
decisions. This suggests that we should pay attention not only to the
objective content of information that a jury receives, “but also to the way
in which that content is presented.”46

38

Id.
Id.
40 See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 62 (1980).
41 See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 552 (1978).
42 Robert M. Reyes et al., Judgmental Biases Resulting from Differing Availabilities of
Arguments, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2, 2 (1980).
43 Id. at 4.
44 Id. at 5.
45 A more robust discussion of the vividness bias is reserved for Part III of this Article,
which discusses an experimental test that examines the interaction of the vividness bias with
jury note-taking.
46 See SMITH, supra note 23, at 17.
39
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B. Local Procedural Rules
Local procedural rules generally are matters that are left to the discretion of individual trial courts.47 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a)
states that “a district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may
adopt and amend rules governing its practice” provided the “rule must be
consistent with—but not duplicate—federal statutes and rules.”48 Along
these lines, Rule 83 was amended in 1985 to empower local judges to
create rules of practice before their courts.49 The current version of that
amendment, now codified as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b),
reads: “A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, [certain federal rules], and the district’s local rules.”50
The original intent of Rule 83 was to regulate the “machinery of
running” the local courts so that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
could be “adjusted easily and without friction to the differing habits and
customs of lawyers throughout the country.”51 However, the effect of
Rule 83 has been somewhat different. As commentators have pointed
out, the drafters of Rule 83 would have been quite surprised by the
thousands of local court rules and individual judges’ practice rules that
multiplied after Rule 83 was enacted.52 Many of these local practice
rules deal with procedural issues that could potentially have substantive
effects on legal outcomes.
Local procedural rules are not always codified. Ostensibly, state
and federal case law recognize that many matters of trial procedure are
within the sound discretion of the trial court.53 Although Federal Rule
47 These rules can be codified, as in rules or codes, or they can be the product of judicial
case law. See infra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. These matters are also, in some
instances, left up to individual judges within those courts as well, as part of a judge’s local
practice rules.
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).
49 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 83 advisory committee’s note.
50 FED R. CIV. PROC. 83(b).
51 6 “Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure”
1515 (Feb. 20-25, 1936). See also Myron J. Bromburg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual
Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (quoting and synthesizing the Proceedings).
52 See Bromburg & Korn, supra note 51, at 7.
53 See Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New Eng. R.R. Co., 939 F.2d 128, 133 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“In matters of trial procedure such as that involved here, the trial judge is entrusted
with wide discretion because he is in a far better position than we to appraise the effect of the
improper argument of counsel.”); Layton v. Whitley, No. 1512, 1989 WL 6899, at *2 (9th Cir.
Jan. 20, 1989) (“The trial court’s power to control the conduct of trial is broad. Necessarily
many matters of trial procedure must be left to the discretion of trial judges.”); People v.
Moscatello, 251 N.E.2d 532, 543 (Ill. 1969) (“The granting of discretion to the trial judge
recognizes the superior vantage point of one who sees and hears the witnesses when the record
cannot reproduce actual trial conditions; the practical necessities of judicial administration in
procedural matters; and the necessity of the trial judge’s leeway in evolutionary phases of the
development leading to fixed rules of law. Where matters of the administration of the court’s
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83 and its state law counterparts rarely are cited as authority for this
proposition, these matters of trial procedure frequently involve the local
procedural issues within the purview of a trial judge’s rules of practice or
the rules of the local court to which that judge belongs.54
Accordingly, state and federal rules and case law open the door for
trial judges to enact procedural rules to govern the trials over which they
preside.55 There are various potential rationales for doing so. First, policy makers and higher courts may deem many of these local procedural
rules harmless.56 Thus deviations among courts and individual judges
within the same court would not cause concern. Second, appellate
judges and legislators may have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis in
which they recognize that they do not have the resources to oversee all of
the local procedural issues that can arise in any given trial.57 Thus, even
if some of these local procedural rules are not harmless, the harm does
not warrant removing the trial judge’s discretion over the matter. Third,
perhaps local trial judges should be given the flexibility to accommodate
local conditions and needs that arise during their trials.58 Of course, as
one commentator has warned, it would be too easy to give too much
weight to this third explanation: many national problems have local manifestations, but local symptoms do not always warrant local cures.59 This
may be true especially when a local procedural rule has systematic negative effects on legal outcomes. Finally, it also may be that there is no
particular theory underlying this delegation; it may be that local court
business are involved, such as for example, whether to allow a pretrial conference, discretion
may be practically absolute. In matters of trial procedure such as order of proof or ruling on
rebuttal testimony, discretion may be very wide . . . .”); State v. Sorrell, 568 A.2d 376, 378
(Vt. 1989) (holding that, on a defendant’s motion for acquittal for failure to identify him as the
perpetrator, a trial court’s admission of additional identification evidence at the hearing “out of
an abundance of caution” was not error because such matters of trial procedure are within the
wide discretion of the court).
54 See supra note 53. All involve a local procedural issue within the court’s local rules
or discretion, and none cite Federal Rule 83. Id.
55 These local procedural rules themselves can be formal—memorialized in published
local court rules or published individual practice rules—and informal—as in a judge’s preference for allowing jurors to take notes or not during a trial.
56 See, e.g., Sorrell, 568 A.2d at 378 (“Such matters of trial procedure are common grist
for the exercise of wide discretion by the trial court.”).
57 See, e.g., Moscatello, 251 N.E.2d at 543 (discussing the practical necessities of judicial administration in procedural matters).
58 David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil
Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537, 549
(1985); see also Moscatello, 251 N.E.2d at 543 (“The granting of discretion to the trial judge
recognizes the superior vantage point of one who sees and hears the witnesses when the record
cannot reproduce actual trial conditions.”).
59 Roberts, supra note 58, at 549; cf. John C. Drapp III, The National Standard of Care
in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 101–09 (2003) (discussing the nationalization of the medical
standard of care).
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procedures have been widely viewed as unimportant and not worth explicit theorization.60
This area of legal scholarship, however, is undertheorized; to the
extent scholars have examined these local procedural rules, they have
evaluated whether or not those rules conflict with state or federal ones.61
These scholars have not examined whether we should care if these heterogeneous local practices conflict with each other. For example, if some
local practice has potentially negative systematic effects on legal outcomes, it should trouble us (1) that these local practices exist, and (2)
that certain courts employ them while others do not.
II. LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP ON JURY NOTE-TAKING
To jumpstart the scholarship on the behavioral effects of local procedural rules, this Part discusses one of the most visible of these rules:
jurors’ ability to take notes. Specifically, this Part presents two substantial fields that have yet to be fully synthesized: the long history of local
procedures on juror note-taking and the psychological literature on the
empirical impacts of jurors taking notes. The disconnect between judicial attitudes toward jurors’ ability to take notes and the empirical scholarship on the procedure illustrates the problems this Article identifies.
A. The Legal History
The judicial debate over the efficacy of local trial procedures like
juror note-taking is an old but interesting one. The first judicial opinions
that discussed note-taking appeared in state courts in the late 1800s and
early 1900s.62 These opinions were highly critical of the procedure and
largely outlawed it.63 They reasoned that literate note-taking jurors
would exert undue influence over the illiterate members of the jury.64
60 See, e.g., Layton v. Whitley, No. 1512, 1989 WL 6899, *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 1989)
(describing the broad scope of the trial court’s power as merely a practical necessity).
61 See, e.g., Bromburg & Korn, supra note 51, at 8 (noting that individual judges may
promulgate their own practice, as it is not inconsistent with the Federal Rules); Roberts, supra
note 58, at 549 (discussing Rule 83’s role limiting local rulemaking power).
62 See, e.g., Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492, 495 (1871) (“The juror is to register the evidence, as it is given, on the tablets of his memory, and not otherwise.”).
63 See Thornton v. Weaber, 112 A.2d 344, 348 (Pa. 1955) (noting that it had been “almost universal custom” to disallow the practice).
64 See Watkins v. State, 393 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tenn. 1965); NANCY S. MARDER, THE
JURY PROCESS 107 (Foundation Press 2005); Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking
Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 259,
263 (1997).
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Modern courts require citizens who sit on a jury to be able to read
and write English.65 Nonetheless, throughout much of the twentieth century, courts still were resistant to allowing jurors to take notes.66 Although they abandoned the undue influence rationale that literate jurors
would influence illiterate jurors, courts began articulating other perceived disadvantages to jury note taking.67 For example, although jurors
are now required to be literate, courts have ruled that those who take
notes may still be viewed by those who do not take notes as having an
informational advantage, which might lead non note-takers to defer to
the opinions of note-takers.68 Similarly, other courts observed that notetaking jurors might be seen as more alert and informed simply by virtue
of taking notes.69
Other courts have advanced different rationales. Some worried that
the act of taking notes would distract jurors who chose not to take
notes.70 Moreover, these courts feared that note-taking would distract
the note-taker herself by preventing her from evaluating the demeanor
and credibility of trial witnesses.71 Other courts have voiced similar concerns that the note-taker will not be able to keep up with the speed of the
trial and will become lost.72
Other courts worried that note-taking could lead to bias; courts expressed concern that the notes taken—perhaps those taken under rushed
or hurried circumstances—would not be representative of the evidence at
trial or, worse, that the notes would be factually inaccurate.73 These
courts worried that this may happen particularly if jurors are inexperi65 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2) (2006); see also MARDER, supra, note 64 (“This early justification, however, has little bearing on today’s jurors who are statutorily required to be able to
write in English in order to be considered qualified to serve, at least in federal court.”).
66 See, e.g., Thornton 112 A.2d at 348 (disallowing the practice because it was “almost
universal custom” to do so); Penrod & Heuer, supra note 56, at 263 (discussing the legal
history of jurors taking notes).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 103 F. 457, 470 (W.D. Tenn. 1900) (noting that
jurors who took notes would gain undue influence in discussing the case when consulting
notes to settle conflicts of memory), aff’d 107 F. 753 (6th Cir. 1901); Fischer v. Fischer, 142
N.W.2d 857, 863 (Wis. 1966) (noting that jurors might “attach special emphasis” to facts in
notes).
68 See, e.g., Davis, 103 F. at 470; Thornton, 112 A.2d at 348 (noting that even a judge
assumed that a juror who took notes was more informed or intelligent); Fischer, 142 N.W.2d
at 863.
69 See, e.g., Thornton, 112 A.2d at 347–48; State v. Smith, No. 429-41-8-I, 1999 WL
1259857 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1999) (unpublished); Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64, at
267–68.
70 See Fischer, 142 N.W.2d at 863; Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64, at 267–68.
71 See, e.g., State v. Smith, No. 429-41-8-I, 1999 WL 1259857, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 17, 1999) (unpublished) (“The trial judge . . . cautioned [the jury] that any note taking
should not interfere with assessing the demeanor of witnesses.”).
72 See, e.g., Thornton, 112 A.2d at 348.
73 See, e.g., Davis, 103 F. at 469.
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enced with note-taking.74 Further, note-takers might rely on their notes
at the expense of their own memories, exacerbating the effects of the
factual inaccuracies within their notes and distorting their view of the
evidence presented at trial.75
Still other courts worried about institutional bias; they expressed
concern that unrepresentative notes might favor prosecutors and plaintiffs, who present their case first.76 They worry that jurors might pay
more attention at the beginning of a trial than at the end and that juror
notes may over-represent the plaintiff’s evidence while underrepresenting the defendant’s evidence.77
Finally, other trial judges were preoccupied with the logistics of
note-taking; they worried that note-taking would delay trials by increasing the amount of time jurors would take to deliberate and resolve a legal
dispute.78 Indeed, some progressive late-nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury trial courts permitted note-taking, but only on the condition that
additional time would not be required.79
In the mid-to-late twentieth century, however, both scholars and
professional legal organizations began questioning the assumptions underlying the prohibition on note-taking. In the 1960s, the American Bar
Association issued its Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, which recommended that jurors take notes regarding the evidence presented to
them.80 Similarly, the Federal Judicial Conference recommended that jurors be allowed to take notes, provided those notes would remain confidential.81 Meanwhile, academic articles concerning jury note-taking
began to surface in publications including the Journal of the American
74

See, e.g., Fischer, 142 N.W.2d at 863.
See Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted
by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 448 (1985).
76 But see Gasparovic v. Reed, 5 Pa. D. & C. 531, 534 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1924) (finding
no error when a juror took copious notes of testimony favorable to the plaintiff during the
trial).
77 See Victor E. Flango, Would Jurors Do A Better Job if They Could Take Notes?, 63
JUDICATURE 436, 437 (1980).
78 See Cahill v. Mayor of Baltimore, 98 A. 235, 238 (Md. 1916) (“We see no objection
in a juror taking notes in a case complicated with figures, during the examination of testimony,
and being permitted to take these to the jury room, for the purpose of refreshing his recollection, provided the trial court is satisfied that such action will not delay the trial, or interfere
with the juror following the evidence.”).
79 See, e.g., Lilly v. Griffin, 71 Ga. 535, 540 (1883); Tift v. Towns, 63 Ga. 237, 242
(1879); Cahill, 98 A. at 238.
80 AM. BAR ASS’N, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.2 (1968). This principle exists today as Principle
13(A) of the American Bar Association’s Principles for Juries and Jury Trials. American Bar
Association, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials (2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/jurprojectstandards/principles.authcheckdam.pdf.
81 Judicial Conference Committee on the Jury System, The Jury System in the Federal
Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 424 (1960).
75
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Judicial Society,82 Judicature,83 and the Chicago-Kent Law Review,84
further highlighting the issue for reform. Perhaps buoyed by the public
positions of these well regarded organizations and the ease with which
this reform could be implemented,85 courts began to retreat from their
longstanding restrictions on jury note-taking. By the late 1970s, nine
states had repealed their prohibitions on the practice.86
Meanwhile, courts began to consider the potential benefits of allowing jurors to take notes. In a legal sea change on the subject, courts
began taking the position that note-taking would provide a beneficial
memory aid to jurors.87 As one particularly progressive trial judge stated
in a 1940 opinion, “Judges and lawyers make notes, why not jurors?
Certainly . . . [note-taking would] allow them to more intelligently consider the evidence.”88 In a complete reversal from prior opinions, other
courts opined that note-taking would not only refresh a juror’s recollection, but that it also may allow jurors to follow the proceedings more
attentively.89 Similarly, courts now believe that note-taking will improve
juror decision-making and recollection of trial evidence.90 Perhaps stemming from that view, courts also consider note-taking to lead to increased
juror recall and satisfaction with respect to the trial process and the
verdict.91
82

Should Jurors Be Allowed to Take Notes?, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 57 (1948).
Should Jurors Take Notes?, 56 JUDICATURE 139 (1972); Readers’ Viewpoint: Taking
Sides on Taking Notes, 56 JUDICATURE 298 (1972).
84 Arthur L. Newell, May a Juror Take Notes in Illinois?, 46 CHI-KENT L. REV. 223
(1969).
85 See Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of Complete
Inter-Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 527, 550 (1999).
86 Henry Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in STATE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
FUTURE 70, 73 (Theodore J. Fetter ed., 1978) (describing the prohibition of note-taking as “a
needless obstacle” and noting that nine states have repealed it).
87 See United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
88 Id.; see also United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344, 353 (N.D. Iowa 1956)
(describing the arguments offered against jury note-taking as “far-fetched” and “imaginary”);
Miresso v. State, 323 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing the fallibility of memory and the complexities of the modern courtroom in acknowledging a trial court’s discretion
to allow jury note-taking); Watkins v. State, 393 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tenn. 1965) (conceding
that jury note-taking might be “commendable” in some instances).
89 See Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211, 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (“We find that jurors
may benefit from notes in several ways: (1) jurors may follow the proceedings more closely
and pay more attention as they take notes for later use; (2) jurors’ memories may be more
easily and reliably refreshed during deliberations; (3) jurors may make fewer requests to have
portions of trial transcript read back during deliberations; and (4) the ability to use their notes
may result in increased juror morale and satisfaction.”).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., State v. Doleszny, 844 A.2d 773, 781–82 (Vt. 2004) (describing several jury
trial innovations and mentioning that empirical research found increased satisfaction with the
process among mock jurors).
83
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Consistent with these (until recently) empirically untested notions of
the potential benefits of note-taking, the legal and judicial pendulum has
swung firmly in favor of allowing trial judges to permit juror note-taking.92 Currently, nearly all fifty states permit note-taking by either statute or common law.93 Although the United States Supreme Court has
not addressed this issue directly,94 all federal courts of appeal agree that
trial judges have this authority.95 Courts have even held that judges may
allow juror note-taking sua sponte, without first receiving a request or
motion from counsel.96 And at least one appellate court has held that a
trial court could require that jurors take notes, albeit the court did so with
some reservations.97 Although some jurisdictions have required judges
to give admonishing instructions to jurors to ensure that notes are used
correctly,98 the judicial view appears to be positive and generally accepting of the procedure.99
Interestingly, both the judiciary’s initial resistance and later acceptance of jury note-taking appear to be shaped by anecdotal, armchair analysis from appellate courts.100 It might not be surprising to see the
pendulum swing from one extreme to another due to the changing views
92 See infra notes 93–99. Interestingly, note-taking has not been made mandatory in any
jurisdiction.
93 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 39(p); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(d); COLO. R. CIV. P. 47(t);
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16(f); IND. R. CT. JURY 20; ME. R. CIV. P. 45(e); WYO. R. CIV. P. 39.1(a);
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 24.1(a); State v. Mejia, 658 A.2d 571, 576–77 (Conn. 1995); People v.
DiLuca, 85 A.D.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); State v. Rose, 748 A.2d 1283, 1286 (R.I.
2000).
94 The closest the United States Supreme Court has come to addressing the issue of jury
note-taking is its opinion in Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 45 (1897). Agnew faced
trial for misappropriation of funds, and objected when the trial court allowed a juror to take
notes of the proceedings. Because the record did not demonstrate that any juror had actually
taken notes during the trial, the Court declined to address the defendant’s challenge. Id.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 672 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Maclean, 578 F.2d 64, 65 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 584
F.2d 148, 157–58 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 705–06 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 159–60 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Braverman, 522 F.2d 218,
224 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pollack, 433 F.2d 967, 967–68 (5th Cir. 1970); Toles v.
United States, 308 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1962); Goodloe v. United States, 188 F.2d 621,
621–22 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
96 People v. Hues, 704 N.E.2d 546, 548–49 (N.Y. 1998).
97 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963) (noting that the
practice could lead to reversible error in other circumstances).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); Toles, 308 F.2d at
594; People v. Dexheimer, 214 A.D.2d 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Price v. State, 887 S.W.2d
949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
99 However, recent opinions express some reservations about the practice. See, e.g.,
Darden, 70 F.3d at 1537 (characterizing note-taking as “not a favored procedure” and worrying that jurors who take notes will dominate jury deliberations in lengthy and complex trials).
100 For example, compare the reasoning in the authorities cited at supra, notes 62–64,
65–75, 77–79 with the reasoning in the authorities cited at supra, notes 87–91,93–98.
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of influential political and academic groups within the profession. But
notably, this change happened without almost any empirical evidence of
the actual effects that note-taking has on jurors’ attitudes, behaviors, and
judgments. Rigorous empirical tests of juror note-taking, though few in
nature, emerged in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s and
2000s.101 The results of those studies did not provide wholesale support
for the views of judges and legal academics that note-taking would aid
recall, lead to better judgments, and lead to greater satisfaction.102
B. Empirical Scholarship
The empirical literature is not so uncritically accepting of the perceived benefits of allowing decision-makers to take notes; scholars have
attempted to study the phenomenon in a systematic way free of “haphazard” appellate court speculations about the merits and disadvantages of
the procedure.103 Nonetheless, despite a dearth of evidence supporting
the efficacy of jury note-taking—for example, that note taking improves
recall or that jurors are more satisfied with their verdicts, empirical researchers have written that, at best, note taking has “no harmful consequences.”104 Although the sparse literature on jury-note taking is
somewhat conflicted, it tends to converge on this middling, no-harm-nofoul assessment.105
This section will examine the history of empirical scholarship on
jury note-taking. First it will discuss the origins of note-taking scholarship in the educational psychology literature. Second, it will discuss the
shift in the scholarship from academic to non-academic settings, including the modern courtroom.
1. The Birth of Psychological Note-Taking Scholarship
Scholars disagree about the current state of academic note-taking
scholarship. As late as 2007, one researcher declared that “very little is
101 See, e.g., Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing
Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256
(1996).
102 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 101, at 261 (indicating a shift in judges’ perceptions
from essentially undecided before exposure (median = 4.5) to a moderate endorsement after
exposure (median = 3.7)); Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64, at 280 (“[O]ur findings offer little
affirmative support for the purported advantages of note taking and questions.”).
103 See Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64, at 262 (“Appellate judges writing these decisions
appear content to use their own anecdotal experiences and armchair analyses to evaluate the
procedures . . . .”).
104 Id. at 280 (characterizing the procedure as “innocuous”); Heuer & Penrod, supra note
101, at 256.
105 See Penrod & Heuer, supra note 64, at 280 (concluding that some might argue that the
lack of purported harmful consequences therefore means these procedures should not be
modified).
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known about the cognitive processes that underlie effective . . . note taking.”106 Conversely, another researcher described note-taking as “one of
the first and most established [types of] cognitive technology.”107 Spanning several decades, significant empirical scholarship supporting the latter view has attempted to isolate and study those cognitive processes that
underlie note-taking.108 The first wave of substantial empirical study of
note-taking can be traced back to the writings of educational psychologists in the early 1970s.109 Nearly all of these studies focused on how
people take lecture notes in an academic setting.110 These early studies
examined whether taking notes during a lecture leads to better retention
of the material covered in the lecture.111 Surprisingly, early experiments
revealed conflicting evidence as to whether or not note-taking facilitates
retention of new information.112 Although later experiments appeared to
support the view that note-taking does facilitate the retention of new information, they did so cautiously.113
Nonetheless, educational psychologists attempted to develop a coherent theory for how note-taking aids recall. Two dueling theories originally were proposed as the mechanisms by which note-taking enhances
memory for facts.114 The first hypothesis—“encoding”—involves the
processing of physical sensory input into a person’s memory.115 According to the encoding hypothesis, taking notes transforms the information,
as the listener is hearing it, into a subjectively more meaningful form; the
process of recording notes itself facilitates learning.116 In contrast, an
alternative hypothesis theorized that simply having the notes for later
review is more important than encoding the information as the lecture is
given.117 Educational psychologists refer to this as the “external storage”
106 Stephen T. Peverly et al., What Predicts Skill in Lecture Note Taking?, 99 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 167, 167 (2007).
107 Tamas Makany et al., Optimising the Use of Note-taking as an External Cognitive Aid
for Increasing Learning, 40 BRITISH J. EDUC. TECH. 619, 619 (2009).
108 See generally id.; Edwin G. Aiken et al., Memory for a Lecture: Effects of Notes,
Lecture Rate, and Informational Density, 67 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 439 (1975); Kenneth A.
Kierwa et al., Note-Taking Functions and Techniques, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 240 (1991).
109 See Francis Di Vesta & Susan Gray, Listening and Note Taking, 63 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
8 (1972); Donald Peters, Effects of Note Taking and Rate of Presentation on Short-Term Objective Test Performance, 63 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 276 (1972).
110 See generally Makany et al., supra note 107, Peverly et al., supra note 106.
111 See, e.g., Aiken et al., supra note 108.
112 Compare Di Vesta & Gray, supra note 109, with Peters, supra note 109.
113 See, e.g., Kierwa et al, supra note 108, at 243–44 (discussing the potential pathways
that may facilitate note taking while stating that future research is necessary).
114 Compare John R. Anderson, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 171–203
(Worth Publishers 6th Ed. 2005), with John F. Carter & Nicholas H. Van Matre, Note Taking
Versus Note Having, 67 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 900, 900 (1975).
115 See generally Anderson, supra note 114.
116 See generally Carter & Van Matre, supra note 114.
117 Id.
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hypothesis.118 Initially, experimental evidence conflicted.119 However,
researchers harmonized these hypotheses into a comprehensive theory
about note-taking, stating that (1) the act of reviewing notes is beneficial,
and (2) note-taking also is beneficial independent of the review of those
notes.120
Under this framework, researchers focused on the types of information note-takers include in their notes and what types of information lead
to better performance on examinations.121 Perhaps unsurprisingly, transcription fluency—the ability to quickly transcribe the details of a lecture—is linked to superior performance. 122 More interestingly,
educational psychologists have identified a “levels effect” in the way
participants take notes.123 The term “levels effect” refers to the tendency
of students to emphasize the information that they consider to be important, in contrast to information that they do not, when taking notes or
recalling a lecture.124 In other words, students focus their attention on
what they consider the “highest-level information” in a lecture.125 Although seemingly obvious and uninteresting, this invites the following
question relevant to jury decision-making: what do students consider
“highly important information” when they take notes? Perhaps more importantly, what happens to students’ memories for information not
deemed “highly important?” The experiment reported in this Article answers this question.
2. Jury Note-Taking
In recent years, scholars have reviewed the academic literature to
determine whether the rigorous study of academic note-taking has spread
to other fields where people take notes—including the legal context,
counseling and medical situations, and occupational settings.126 Studies
of juror note-taking are the most prevalent, although the absolute num118 See Harold Faw & T. Gary Walker, Mathemagenic Behaviours and Efficiency in
Learning from Prose Materials: Review, Critique and Recommendations, 46 REV. EDUC. RES.
691, 696 (1976).
119 Compare Richard Peper & Richard Meyer, Note Taking as a Generative Activity, 70 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 514 (1978), with Carter & Van Matre, supra note 114, and, Kierwa et al.,
supra note 108.
120 Kenneth A. Kierwa, Investigating Note-taking and Review: A Depth of Processing
Alternative, 20 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 23, 23, 26 (1985).
121 Peverly, supra note 106, at 167.
122 Id.
123 Kenneth A. Kierwa et al., Effects of Repetition on Recall and Note-Taking: Strategies
for Learning from Lectures, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 120, 120 (1991).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See James Hartley, Notetaking in Non-Academic Settings: A Review, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 559 (2002).
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bers are thin and the results complex.127 In sum, the literature reflects a
positive but ambivalent stance regarding the efficacy of juror note-taking
on such factors as recall, judgment, and satisfaction.
Studies of juror note-taking fall into two categories: field studies
and laboratory studies. Field studies examine actual jurors as they decide
actual legal disputes in court while laboratory studies observe the judgments and behavior of mock jurors who either watch or read a fictionalized version of a trial under controlled conditions.128 Both methods have
strengths and weaknesses. Field studies permit researchers to see how
note-taking works in the real world. Field studies also have several
drawbacks: trials vary in length, level of complexity, type of evidence,
and subject matter.129 These confounding variables can create a
“clouded view” of the effects of note-taking on juror decision making.130
Laboratory experiments control for these variables and allow researchers
to make unambiguous statements about cause and effect.131 Commentators, including policy makers and legal practitioners, have criticized laboratory experiments because they lack verisimilitude and external
validity; their results may not reflect what actually happens in real courtrooms.132 These limitations do not render field studies and laboratory
experiments useless to policy makers. Rather, taken together, field studies and laboratory experiments provide convergent insight into the benefits and drawbacks of allowing jurors to take notes.
a) Field Studies
Early note-taking field studies focused on legal actors’ subjective
experiences with jury note-taking instead of whether note-taking leads to
verdicts that are more accurate. The first field study of juror note-taking
occurred in 1980.133 In this pilot study, experimenters observed the
judgments of actual jurors serving on two civil trials and two criminal
trials in DuPage County, Illinois.134 In one civil trial and in one criminal
127 As of 2011, there are just four field studies and six experimental studies on note taking. See discussion of studies infra Part II.B.2.a.
128 Compare the methodologies in the field study reported at infra, note 132, with the
laboratory studies reported at infra, note 164.
129 David L. Rosenhan et al., Note Taking Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
53, 54 (1994).
130 Id.
131 See generally Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin & A. Horowitz, The Effects of Jury-Aid Innovations on Juror Performance in Complex Civil Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 185 (2003); see also
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102
MICH. L. REV. 460, 483 (2003).
132 See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: A
Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231,
232 (1988).
133 Flango, supra note 77.
134 Id. at 439.
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trial, jurors were allowed to take notes on the proceedings.135 In the
other civil and criminal trials, jurors were not permitted to take notes.136
All participants later filled out questionnaires about their experiences and
turned over their notes if they took them.137 Jurors self-reported that
they understood the case better when they took notes and that the availability of notes improved the quality of their deliberations.138 The researchers did not collect objective data to verify these self-reported
impressions, but they did note that at least half the jurors took more notes
at the beginning of the trial than at the end.139
A second field study, conducted five years later in selected federal
district courts in New York, examined the attitudes of legal actors toward
note-taking in thirty-two trials in which jurors took notes.140 Like the
first field study on note-taking, this study focused on the subjective assessments of note-taking procedures by legal actors including judges and
attorneys.141 Consistent with the results found in the first field study,
judges and jurors favored juror note-taking, while attorneys varied in
their responses (with prosecutors and plaintiffs’ counsel responding more
favorably than defense counsel).142 In their subjective assessments,
judges stated that note-taking jurors appeared to pay attention during
trial, sometimes took substantial notes, and reported that their notes provided a useful memory aid.143 Again, the study did not include objective
measures of note-taking accuracy.
It took several years for researchers to collect more empirically rigorous field-study data on jury note-taking. In 1988, Larry Heuer and
Steven Penrod designed a field study in which twenty-nine Wisconsin
state judges randomly allowed or forbade juror note-taking in sixty-seven
trials.144 After finishing jury service, each juror completed self-report
questionnaires along with factual multiple-choice questions about the
trial in which he or she participated.145
Interestingly, and in contrast to the subjective assessments reported
in the earlier field studies, note-taking did not appear to aid jurors’ mem135

Id.
Id.
137 Id. at 439–40.
138 Id. at 440.
139 Id. at 442.
140 See Sand & Reiss, supra note 75.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 445.
143 Id. at 451.
144 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 133. If judges thought that allowing jurors to take notes
(or disallowing them from taking notes) in a particular trial would compromise the fairness of
the trial, they could exclude that case from the study. Id. at 238–239.
145 The researchers collected questionnaires from 550 jurors, 95 attorneys, and the 63
presiding judges. Id. at 242. Response rates were high, with 69% from jurors, 71% from
attorneys, and 94% from judges. Id.
136
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ories for trial content or jury instructions as compared to cases where
jurors were not permitted to take notes during their trials.146 Nor were
note-taking jurors more confident in their verdicts.147 In sum, there was
no objective support for the proposed advantages of juror note-taking
aside from jurors’ (potential) self-perceived satisfaction.148 Nonetheless,
the field study provided no support for the proposed disadvantages of
juror note-taking: judges presiding over these trials did not find juror
note-taking to be distracting; note-taking jurors were not viewed by other
jurors as possessing an unfair advantage during deliberations; jurors selfreported that their notes were a valuable resource to them during trial
(and that these notes were not an unfair or inaccurate record of the proceedings); plaintiffs and prosecutors did not appear to be favored by
note-takers simply because they presented their cases first at trial; and
note-taking did not lengthen deliberations or result in acrimonious debate
during those deliberations.149
In search of a more representative sample and greater statistical
power to detect any potential benefits conferred by note-taking, Heuer
and Penrod expanded this field experiment six years later to include 103
trials from 33 different U.S. states.150 The results of this expanded field
experiment largely mirrored the results from Heuer and Penrod’s prior
work. Likewise, there was no evidence that note-taking served as a
memory aid and, unlike in their prior experiment, note-taking did not
increase juror satisfaction with the trial process.151 Further, note-taking
did not appreciably affect verdicts: judge-jury agreement in trials where
note-taking was allowed (68%) did not differ statistically from judgejury agreement in trials where note taking was not allowed (69%).152
Nonetheless, as in Heuer and Penrod’s prior work, the study did not support any of the proposed disadvantages of jury note-taking either.153 In
sum, these field experiments on jury note-taking produced inconclusive
results. There was virtually no support for the proposed benefits of notetaking, yet there was no support for any of its potential harms either.
146

Id. at 231.
Note-taking jurors did report that they were more satisfied with the trial procedure and
verdict, but this effect was only marginally significant. Id. at 246.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 246–51.
150 Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Noteataking and Question Asking During Trials;
A Natural Field Experiment, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994). In this expanded field experiment, nearly nine in ten jurors who could take notes did so, an increase of 20% from their
previous study. Id. at 135. Jurors, on average, took more notes as well, averaging 7.1 pages in
criminal trials and 14.4 pages in longer civil trials (compared to 5.4 pages of notes overall in
Heuer and Penrod’s previous study). Id.; cf. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 132, at 244.
151 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 150, at 137–38.
152 Id. at 135.
153 Id. at 137–40.
147
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b) Laboratory Studies
Initially, the empirical evidence for jury note-taking did not fare
much better under controlled laboratory experiments. The first laboratory experiment on jury note-taking, conducted in 1983 by psychologist
Reid Hastie, found that note-taking actually interfered with mock jurors’
ability to recall trial facts and inhibited their performance.154 Hastie randomly assigned participants155 into six-person mock juries, some of
which were permitted to take notes and some of which were not.156 All
participants viewed a seventy-five-minute videotape of a simulated civil
trial, and were, immediately afterwards, asked questions testing their recall of trial facts and comprehension of the case.157 Surprisingly, jurors
who took notes remembered fewer aspects of the judicial instructions158
than did participants who relied on their memory alone.159 Further, a
significant number of participants in Hastie’s experiment did not use
notes to record important trial facts.160 Instead, they doodled in their
notebooks or wrote down “barely decipherable scribblings.”161 Further,
when they recorded inaccurate facts in their notes, other jurors were unlikely to correct them.162 Based on these results, Hastie concluded that
jurors do not take notes well, use them effectively, or find the note-taking
process helpful.163
In the ensuing two decades, only five additional laboratory experiments examined jury note-taking.164 However, those experiments became more methodologically sophisticated and provided evidence
indicating that jury note-taking may have positive effects on legal deci154

Heuer & Penrod, supra note 132 at 233–36.
Study participants were jury-eligible citizens who had been called for jury duty at their
local courthouse. Id. at 233 (citing Hastie).
156 Id. (citing Hastie, supra note 154).
157 Id. (citing Hastie).
158 Id. (citing Hastie). This finding was marginally significant.
159 There is a plausible explanation for this. Note-taking might cause participants to rely
on their notes more (or to encode less information into long-term memory on the expectation
that they could rely on their notes later). However, Hastie did not allow jurors to use their
notes during the recall phase of his experiment. See id. (citing Hastie).
160 Id. at 234 (citing Hastie).
161 Id. at 235 (citing Hastie).
162 Id. (citing Hastie).
163 Id. at 226 (citing Hastie).
164 Lynne ForsterLee et al., Effects of Notetaking on Verdicts and Evidence Processing in
a Civil Trial, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 567, 569 (1994); Lynne FosterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz,
Enhancing Juror Competence in a Complex Trial, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 305
(1997); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Jury Size, Evidence Complexity, and Note Taking on Jury Process and Performance in a Civil Trial, 87 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 121 (2003); Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne FosterLee, The Effects of Notetaking and
Trial Transcript Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 373 (2001); David L. Rosenhan et al., supra note 129.
155
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sions.165 In 1994, David Rosenhan and colleagues created the first laboratory experiment to examine jury note-taking since Hastie’s study in
1983.166 Rosenhan’s results were mixed. Note-taking led to greater recall for facts but did not lead to more accuracy with respect to comprehension of trial facts.167
That same year, Lynne ForsterLee and colleagues examined jury
note-taking by playing a two-hour audio file of a complex toxic tort case.
Participants were asked questions about the trial and decided the amount
which four plaintiffs should be compensated.168 Participants who took
notes remembered more relevant trial information regardless of whether
they reviewed those notes or not.169 More importantly, liability and
damages judgments differed based on the severity of each plaintiff’s injury when jurors took notes, suggesting that note-takers made more accurate decisions than did participants who did not take notes.170 This was
the first jury study to report data that note-taking actually may lead to
better jury decisions.
ForsterLee’s study did not, however, explain the way in which notetaking improves decision-making accuracy. To investigate that, FosterLee and psychologist Irwin Horowitz published a follow-up study
three years later.171 The researchers generally replicated their prior findings: note-taking had an effect on decision making, but that effect was
relatively weak.172 More interestingly, the researchers determined that
note-taking increased recall for trial facts, and that recall correlated with
more accurate decisions.173
165

See supra note 164.
Rosenhan compared note-takers and non note-takers in a complex civil finance trial.
Participants then completed a questionnaire about the trial. Rosenhan et al., supra note 129, at
53.
167 Id. at 59.
168 ForsterLee et al., supra note 164.
169 Id. at 567. Participants either (1) took notes and used them while filling out the questionnaire, (2) took notes but did not use them to fill out the questionnaire, or (3) did not take
notes. Id. at 571.
170 Id. at 569. The assumption underlying the study is that rational triers of fact will
apportion damages awards in accordance with the degree of injury sustained by a given
plaintiff.
171 The study design was similar to their previous study, although ForsterLee and
Horowitz also included an experimental variable that examined the role of pretrial and posttrial
jury instructions on legal decision-making. ForsterLee & Horowitz, supra note 164.
172 Id. at 309–10.
173 Id. at 316. Horowitz published two additional laboratory studies on jury note-taking,
examining it in conjunction with access to trial transcripts, timing of jury instructions, and the
size of the jury. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 164; Horowitz & FosterLee, supra note
164. Horowitz found that note-taking led to better recognition of probative evidence than did
access to trial transcripts, pretrial instructions increased the accuracy of note-taking jurors, and
smaller juries benefit from note taking more than do larger juries.
166
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In sum, there is an intriguing disconnect between the field studies
and the laboratory studies.174 Although the field studies find no support
for the supposed disadvantages of juror note-taking, they do not find
much support for any of its supposed advantages either.175 In contrast,
laboratory studies weakly support the contention that note-taking aids
memory for trial facts, comprehension, and accuracy of decisionmaking.176
These studies provide cautious support that note-taking is beneficial
to juror decision-making or, at the least, that it is not harmful. This generally is consistent with the current, rosier judicial attitude toward notetaking, which leaves the practice to the discretion of trial judges.177 But
given what we now know about the role of contextual cues on decision
making, particularly how framing effects can bias our judgments, it is
possible that note-taking actually may bias our decisions in systematic
ways.178 There might be a real disadvantage to allowing jurors to take
notes that has not yet been detected in the sparse empirical literature. For
example, if the vividness of the trial evidence179 can bias our judgments
about a defendant’s guilt or liability, might note-taking exacerbate our
recall for that vivid evidence at the expense of other probative evidence?
If so, allowing jurors to take notes may contribute to this vividness bias.
Part III of this Article presents an experiment that tests this hypothesis.
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: JURY NOTE-TAKING
Recall that local procedural rules are heterogeneous.180 If any particular local procedural rule systematically biases legal decision making,
this can create several issues. The transparency, accuracy, and equity of
legal outcomes are called into question when similarly, or identically,
situated parties enter different courtrooms and receive different judgments.181 Empirical legal scholars are particularly well suited to identify
these rules and test their effects experimentally.
This experiment examines whether note-taking exacerbates framing
effects with respect to the way evidence is presented at trial. The experiment will focus on the vividness bias, discussed briefly in Part I above,
174 See discussion supra note 154; ForsterLee et al., supra note 164; ForsterLee &
Horowitz, supra note 131; Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 164; Horowitz & ForsterLee,
supra note 164; Rosenhan et al., supra note 131.
175 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 132 at 233–36 (citing Hastie).
176 FosterLee et al., supra note 164; ForsterLee & Horowitz, supra note 164; Horowitz &
Bordens, supra note 164; Horowitz & ForsterLee, supra note 164; ROSENHAN ET AL., supra
note 129.
177 Horowitz & ForsterLee, supra note 164, at 375.
178 See supra Part I.A.
179 See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text and infra Part III.
180 See supra Part I.B.
181 Id.
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which influences legal decision-making in the absence of note-taking.182
Before discussing the methodology and results, it is worth discussing
vividness bias in detail and how it affects legal decision-making.
A. The Vividness Bias
In their classic text on social judgment, research psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross argued that people’s judgments and behavior
are heavily influenced by vivid, concrete information as compared to pallid and abstract information—even if the pallid and abstract information
contains greater probative and evidential value.183 Nisbett and Ross defined “vivid information” as information that is “likely to attract and hold
our attention and to excite the imagination to the extent that it is (a)
emotionally interesting, (b) concrete and imagery-provoking, and (c)
proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way.”184 Emotionally interesting information is information with which we are familiar and that has
“hedonic relevance” to us.185 Concrete information is information that
increases the “imaginability” of an event because it contains detail and
specificity about the actors, actions, and situational context.186 Temporal, spatial, and sensory proximity of information refers to how close an
event or piece of information at issue is to a person in time and space.187
Nisbett and Ross hypothesized that vivid information has greater
potential to influence our judgments because human memory retains
vivid information more easily.188 They based this hypothesis on experimental studies that demonstrated that concrete words, such as the word
“boat” in a word list, were better remembered than abstract concepts like
the word “justice.”189 They reasoned that vivid words, as compared to
their pallid counterparts, are encoded in two distinct forms in our memories: verbal form and image form.190 They postulated that this “dual encoding” leads to better retention and recall of vivid information.191
Further, greater retention and recall of vivid information also affects
our social judgments through a mechanism called the availability heuristic. In their groundbreaking article on heuristics and biases, psycholo182

See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 40, at 43–62; see also HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION
440–41 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (discussing how vivid
information captures attention and encourages elaborative processing).
184 NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 40, at 45.
185 Id. at 46.
186 Id. at 147.
187 Id. at 49–51.
188 Id. at 51.
189 Id.; see also Allan Paivio, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES 200–02 (Holt, Rinehart
& Winston 1971).
190 NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 40, at 51. See also Paivio, supra note 190, at 207–09.
191 NISBETT & ROSS, supra note 40, at 50–53.
183
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gists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky described a heuristic as a rule
that “reduce[s] the complex task[ ]of assessing probabilities and predicting value[ ] to simpler judgmental operations.”192 According to
Kahneman and Tversky, people judge the likelihood of some event according to the ease with which instances of that event come to mind.193
People determine the likelihood of an event by its availability of recall in
their memory.194 This cognitive shortcut can be useful when events that
are more frequent are also more memorable; however, this cognitive
shortcut can become a bias when information that most easily comes to
mind is influenced by irrelevant factors, including the salience or vividness of the information.195
Under this framework, psychologists have spent the past three decades attempting to refine the contours of the vividness effect and identify the circumstances under which it affects social judgment. Based on
Nisbett and Ross’s work, psychologists have constructed a working definition of the vividness effect as “the differentially persuasive impact that
[vivid] information is thought to have on attitudes, relative to information that is presented in a more pallid and dull form.”196 Vividness effect
studies have fallen into two camps: (1) studies that vary the vividness of
the mode in which evidence is presented, such as varying whether a message is read, heard, or seen through pictures or video;197 and, (2) studies
that vary the vividness of the message itself by manipulating qualities of
the message, such as the concreteness of its language.198
192 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). See also Jonathan Shedler & Melvin Manis, Can The Availability Heuristic Explain Vividness Effects?, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 26 (1986).
Scholars of heuristics analogize the mind to an information processor with a limited capacity.
Thus, the mind looks for ways to conserve its cognitive resources, often through the use of
these mental shortcuts.
193 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 193, at 1127.
194 As other psychologists have explained: “This rule of thumb is a heuristic [because] it
shortcuts the lengthier procedure of exhaustively recalling a large sample of events and then
calculating [probabilities].” Reyes et al., supra note 42, at 2.
195 A famous experiment will make this abstract concept more concrete. Psychologist
Paul Slovic and colleagues researched mortality statistics available from the National Center
for Health Statistics. Slovic noticed that the mortality rate of so-called “silent killers” like heart
disease and cancer was considerably higher than the mortality rate of more highly publicized
causes of death, including car accidents, fires, and homicides. Slovic then set up an experiment where he paired silent killers with the highly publicized killers. He then asked research
participants to decide which killer was a more likely cause of death. Consistent with the
availability heuristic, participants judged the highly publicized, more vivid causes of death to
be significantly more likely to occur than the less vivid silent killers like heart disease and
cancer. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., supra note 41.
196 Shelley E. Taylor & Joanne V. Wood, The Vividness Effect: Making a Mountain Out
of a Molehill?, 10 ADV. IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 540, 540 (1983).
197 See infra Part III.A.1.a.
198 See infra Part III.A.1.b.
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Because there are different ways to define and manipulate “vividness,” the vividness effect suffers from problems with construct validity.199 It should not be surprising that experiments examining the
ubiquity of the vividness effect on social preferences have produced
mixed results.200 Nonetheless, three general patterns emerge. First,
vivid information affects memory; specifically, several experiments
demonstrate that vivid information is better recalled than pallid information.201 Second, differentially recalled vivid information affects social
judgment.202 Third, the vividness effect is most pronounced when vivid
information competes with more pallid information for our attention.
When we confront situations in which we must split our attention between vivid and pallid information, the vivid information is likely to
drown out the pallid (but potentially quite probative) information and
will affect our judgments.203

199 Construct validity refers to the fit between a conceptual definition (here, vividness
bias) and the way the variables designed to test it in an experiment are operationalized. See
generally Shelley E. Taylor and Suzanne C. Thompson, Stalking the Elusive “Vividness” Effect, 89 PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (1982).
200 Compare William C. Miller, Film Movement and Affective Response and the Effect on
Learning and Attitude Formation, 17 AV COMM. REV. 172 (1969) (finding no effects), with
David L. Nasser & William J. McEwen, The Impact of Alternative Media Channels: Recall
and Involvement with Messages, 24 AV COMM. REV. 263 (1976) (finding effects). For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Taylor & Thompson, supra note 200.
201 For example, Kahneman and Tversky had participants read a list of male and female
names and asked participants to estimate the proportion of men and women on the list. Some
participants read a list with very famous female names (for example, Elizabeth Taylor) and
regular male names; other participants read a list with famous male names (for example, Richard Nixon) and ordinary female names. Participants overestimated the proportion of whichever sex contained the names of famous people on the list and remembered more of those
names than they did the ordinary names. See Denise R. Beike & Steven J. Sherman, Social
Inference: Inductions, Deductions, and Alaogies, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 209,
214 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1984).
202 For example, in an experiment by psychologist Paul Herr and colleagues, participants
were either given an in-person, word-of-mouth review of a new computer system, or they were
asked to read that same review in the form of a Consumer Reports excerpt about the computer.
Participants remembered more of the information when it was presented to them by a human
being and their attitudes toward the computer more closely matched the attitude of the inperson reviewer than the attitude expressed in the magazine excerpt. Paul M. Herr et al.,
Effects of Word-of-Mouth and Product-Attribute Information on Persuasion: An AccessibilityDiagnosticity Perspective, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 454 (1991). However, empirical studies of
the relationship between memory and judgment have yielded complex results that have been
contradictory at times. See Reid Hastie & Bernadette Park, The Relationship Between Memory
and Judgment Depends on Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-Based or On-Line, 93
PSYCHOL. REV. 258 (1986).
203 As explained by psychologists Shelley Taylor and Joanne Wood, when riding the subway, one may listen to music, catch the headlines of a newspaper, or glance at a magazine, all
simultaneously. Taylor & Wood, supra note 198, at 541.
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1. Applications to the Courtroom
If we think of legal judgments as social judgments reached under
conditions of uncertainty—for example, as the probability that a defendant has committed some crime given a certain set of facts—heuristics
generally, particularly the vividness effect and the availability bias, become highly relevant.204 Vivid information frequently is presented to
juries in court. For example, parties routinely use demonstrative evidence, including computer-generated accident reconstructions and gruesome crime scene photographs, as testimonial aids in jury trials.205 Less
obviously, adversarial characterizations of the evidence by trial counsel
during questioning of witnesses and during summations also present
vivid information to jurors.206 If vividly presented evidence has the potential to bias decision makers, this should interest legal policy makers.
Although experimental tests of vividness effects on jurors are relatively
rare, a few psychologists have examined (1) the potential effects of gruesome demonstrative evidence207 and (2) the effects of vivid language on
juror verdicts.208 These very different experiments converge on the same
conclusion: that vividly presented evidence has the potential to bias
jurors.
a) Mode Vividness
In the 1990s, psychologists examined whether manipulating the vividness of the mode in which evidence is presented at trial would affect
mock jurors’ legal judgments; these experiments focused particularly on
the effect of gruesome crime scene photographs and videos on jurors.209
204 See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of
the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 957 (2006) (stating that research on “decisions under conditions of uncertainty[ ] and jury behavior are plainly relevant to evidence
law”).
205 See Gordon Bermant, Courting the Virtual: Federal Courts in an Age of Complete
Inter-Connectedness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 527 (1999); Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild
Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, The Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for
Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 165 (2000);
Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication Technologies
are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 227,
233 (2006).
206 See Thomas A. Mauet, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 13–29 (6th Ed. 2002) (discussing the “psychology of persuasion” useful to an advocate arguing a case before a jury).
207 See infra Part III.A.1.a.
208 See infra Part III.A.1.b.
209 See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on
Mock Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 485 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and TrialSpecific Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1459, 1466–69 (1991); see also Vicki L. Fishfader, et al., Evidential and Extralegal Factors in
Juror Decisions: Presentation Mode, Retention and Level of Emotionality, 20 L. & HUM.
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Subject to a few caveats,210 the researchers found that vividly presented
evidence of a crime scene affected jurors’ judgments. Particularly, research participants who read a criminal trial summary accompanied by a
gruesome crime scene videotape lowered the burden of proof necessary
for them to convict the defendant from a “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard to one akin to the “clear and convincing” standard. Seeing a
gruesome crime scene video made it easier for these mock jurors to convict the defendant as compared to mock jurors who had not viewed the
gruesome video.211
This effect is not limited to videotapes. Vivid photographs can affect mock juror judgments. In a similar experiment, psychologist Kevin
Douglas and colleagues had mock jurors read a murder case while viewing photographs.212 Some participants viewed gruesome photographs of
the victim while others only viewed photographs of the victim’s apartment.213 The experimenters found that participants who viewed the vivid
photographs were significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty
but rated themselves just as fair and unbiased as their counterparts who
had not seen the vivid photographs.214 Interestingly, this study supports
the view that the effects of the vividness bias occur outside conscious
awareness.
These results, which manipulate the vividness of the mode in which
evidence is presented to mock jurors, dovetail nicely with results from
other vividness studies, which manipulate the vividness of the message
itself that is presented to mock jurors. These studies are particularly interesting because their effects are not obvious and the manipulations are
more subtle.215
BEHAV. 565 (1996) (examining whether video scene re-creations affect juror decisions by evaluating retention for facts, emotional state, liability assessments, and damages awards).
210 See, e.g., Fishfader et al., supra note 210, at 570 (finding that, in this particular study,
vivid information affected liability judgments but not damages awards).
211 In their study, psychologists Saul Kassin and David Garfield had participants read a
murder transcript that was either accompanied by a gruesome videotape of the murder victim
or was not accompanied by a video tape. Participants were asked, among other things, to
decide whether the defendant was guilty of the murder and were asked to fill in the blank
portion of the following statement: “[T]he defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a
__% chance that he committed the crime.” Interestingly, the researchers found that participants who watched the videotape filled in the blank with an average of 76.56%—akin to the
percentage associated with a “clear and convincing” standard of proof—while participants
who did not view the videotape filled in the blank with an average of 92.99%, akin to the
percentage associated with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Kassin & Garfield,
supra note 210, at 1466–69. In other words, those who had seen the vivid, gruesome videotape lowered their standards for convicting the defendant.
212 Douglas et al., supra note 210, at 485.
213 Id. at 490.
214 Id. at 499.
215 The present experiment discussed in infra Part III employs this methodology.
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b) Message Vividness
Researchers Brad Bell and Elizabeth Loftus provide a concise explanation of how studies that manipulate the vividness of trial testimony
are conducted. Most importantly, the vivid version of the testimony
must contain the same probative value as the ordinary or pallid version of
the testimony.216 Bell and Loftus discuss several ways in which that is
accomplished. First, a pallid description of some object can be replaced
in whole or in part by a more concrete description. For example, the
statement “The robber grabbed the money and a six-pack of soda” can be
replaced with “The Robber grabbed the money and a six-pack of CocaCola.”217 Similarly, more vivid information can be added without altering any of the components of the pallid statement. For example, “Paul
was wearing blue jeans and a white T-shirt” can be attached to the statement “Paul was running across the street when he was struck by the
truck.”218 Further, totally irrelevant details can be added to the testimony, such as what an eyewitness had for dinner on the night of the
crime.219
Under this framework, four experiments have been conducted to determine whether vividly presented evidence actually affects mock trial
outcomes. Psychologists Robert Reyes, William Thompson, and Gordon
Bower conducted an important experiment on the effects of verbally
presented evidence on juror judgments.220 Reyes and his colleagues had
research participants read a drunk-driving case where the defendant had
collided with another vehicle.221 The researchers created two versions of
the prosecution’s evidence and two versions of the defense’s evidence:
vivid and pallid.222 To ensure that vivid information competed with pallid information for mock jurors’ attention, each trial scenario featured a
vivid version of one party’s evidence and a pallid version of the other
party’s evidence.223 Participants rated the likelihood of the defendant’s
guilt immediately after reading the evidence.224 Forty-eight hours later,
participants rated the defendant’s guilt again and were asked to recall as
much of the trial’s evidence as they could remember.225
216 See Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 659 (1985).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Reyes, et al., supra note 42.
221 Id. at 4.
222 See id.
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id. at 4–5.
225 Id.
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The experiment provided powerful support for the vividness bias.226
First, vivid evidence affected participants’ memories of the case’s
facts.227 Specifically, participants remembered the vivid evidence better
than the pallid evidence.228 Moreover, after forty-eight hours, participants provided more extreme judgments of the defendant’s drunkenness
if the prosecution presented vivid evidence because participants relied
more on their memory.229 This was true even though the probative value
of the evidence had not changed.230
Wilson and her colleagues created a civil trial scenario and manipulated the evidence’s vividness in the same manner as did Reyes;231 they
similarly found that vividness affected judgments.232 They also manipulated whether participants received a significant volume of information
during the trial—which would cause differential attention by mock jurors—or a lower volume of information.233 Unlike the Reyes experiment, Wilson and her colleagues demonstrated that vividness also can
affect subjects’ immediate judgments when subjects are presented with a
high volume of information.234
Bensi and his colleagues extended this research by showing that the
vividness bias can affect a juror’s judgment of specific elements of a
party’s case, not just the juror’s judgment of the defendant’s guilt or civil
liability.235 The researchers presented students with a mock transcript of
a trial and asked only whether the defendant shot the victim intentionally.236 The researchers manipulated the vividness of the defense testimony by highlighting irrelevant facts and thus making them more salient
in the testimony presented.237 When the prosecution presented its evidence in pallid form, a majority of participants judged the defendant’s
conduct as unintentional.238 But when the prosecution presented its evi226

Id. at 8.
Id. at 5.
228 Id. at 7.
229 Id. at 6. The direction of the valence depended on which “type” of vivid evidence the
participants read (i.e., vivid prosecution evidence or vivid defense evidence).
230 Id. at 4; see also Shedler & Manis, supra note 193 (replicating Reyes et al.’s results,
although Shedler and Manis’ results suggested a different cognitive pathway that mediated the
results).
231 Marie G. Wilson et al., Information Competition and Vividness Effects in On-Line
Judgments, 44 ORGANIZATIONAL. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 132, 135 (1989). For
example, researchers described a piece of concrete as having “a network of cracks” or a
“spiderweb of cracks.” Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 136–37.
235 L. Bensi, et al., Vividness in Judgements of Guilt, 97 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS
1133 (2003).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 1135.
227
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dence vividly, half the participants judged the defendant’s actions as
intentional.239
Finally, Bell and Loftus examined whether vividness also influences
mock jurors’ perceptions of individual witnesses.240 In two separate experiments, Bell and Loftus examined whether testifying to many vivid
but trivial details makes the testimony of a witness appear more credible.241 In both civil and criminal trials, Bell and Loftus pitted two eyewitnesses against each other, each giving conflicting accounts of the
event.242 Some eyewitnesses testified to several irrelevant but vivid details about the event while others simply identified the perpetrator without discussing those details.243 Consistent with Bell and Loftus’s
hypothesis, participants deemed witnesses who testified to a greater number of vivid details, however trivial, more credible and persuasive.244
B. Experimental Methodology
Currently, no studies examine the interaction between procedural
rules and cognitive biases. Thus, no empirical study has examined what
substantive effects, if any, juror note-taking at trial may have on the vividness bias. This Part describes an original experimental study designed
to examine that issue. This experiment tests whether juror note-taking
alleviates or exacerbates the vividness bias.
Controlled experiments provide the best method for studying how
jury note-taking interacts with the vividness bias.245 In a controlled experiment, all individuals evaluate the same case.246 Researchers are able
to manipulate certain aspects of that case, while holding all other variables constant, and evaluate how subjects respond to the manipulation.247
If subjects respond differently, then one confidently may infer that the
manipulation caused the subjects to respond as they did.248 Conversely,
239

Id.
Bell and Loftus called this “trivial persuasion.” Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The Power of (a Few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989); Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and Mock Juror Judgments, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1171 (1988) (defining trivial persuasion as the effect of trivial details on persuasion).
241 Bell & Loftus, supra note 241, at 1173.
242 Id. at 1175, 1182.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1190.
245 See Robbennolt, supra note 131, at 482–83 (describing the benefits of experimental
simulation methods).
246 Robbennolt, supra note 131, at 482.
247 Cf., e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 131, at 482–83 (describing the experimental simulation process).
248 Robbennolt, supra note 131, at 483.
240
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naturalistic studies of jury behavior generally do not allow researchers to
make causal inferences the way that experimental studies do.249
In this experimental study, participants were asked to act as a mock
juror in a drunk driving case where a defendant was accused of leaving a
holiday party, drunkenly running a stop sign on the way home, and colliding with a cement truck. Because the defendant was not given a blood
alcohol test at the time of his arrest, the evidence against him at trial
largely consisted of the testimony of several party guests. His defense
case largely consisted of the testimony of party guests as well.
Participants read one of three versions of the case: one in which the
prosecution’s evidence was presented in a vivid way, one in which the
defendant’s evidence was presented in a vivid way, or one in which
neither the prosecutor nor the defense presented evidence in a vivid way.
Participants were either allowed or forbidden to take notes about the trial.
Participants also filled out a questionnaire about the trial, rating the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt on a 1–7 Likert scale,250 with 1 representing a judgment that the defendant was not drunk and 7 representing a
judgment that the defendant was drunk. Participants also rated the persuasiveness of the evidence and then recalled as much of the evidence as
they could. Half the experimental participants filled out this questionnaire immediately after reading the scenario while others filled out the
questionnaire forty-eight hours later.251
1. Rationale and Hypotheses
In sum, this experiment consists of three different independent variables: (1) the vividness of the evidence, (2) whether the participants
could take notes, and (3) the length of time before participants rated the
defendant’s drunkenness and recalled the evidence they had read.

249 In sum, the difference between naturalistic studies and experimental studies involves a
trade-off between better control and generalizability. Robbennolt, supra note 131, at 483
n.108.
250 A Likert Scale is a psychometric scale commonly used in questionnaires to capture
data from ordinal variables (from 1 to 7). ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS
IN LAW 172 (2010). Likert Scales are used frequently to collect data from mock jurors, although scholars have noted the limitations of this method. See, e.g., Gerald Albaum, The
Likert Scale Revisited: An Alternate Version, 39 J. MARKET RES. SOC’Y 331, 332 (1997) (“The
standard Likert scale tends to confound the direction and intensity dimensions of attitude so
there may be an under-reporting of the most intense agreement or disagreement (i.e. the extreme position of the scale).”).
251 In psychological parlance, this is a 3 (vividness) x 2 (note-taking) x 2 (time) design.
See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 251, at 99–100 (describing the use of factorial designs when
dealing with at least two levels of variables).
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a) Vividness
As discussed earlier, the vividness of a given message can be
manipulated in two general ways: (1) by changing the medium through
which that message is seen or heard; or (2) by manipulating certain features of the message itself such as its emotionality, concreteness, and
ability to evoke imagery.252 This experiment manipulated features of the
messages as these effects are more subtle and potentially more interesting and pervasive.253
Each drunk driving trial contained seven evidentiary ideas that favored the prosecution (implying that the defendant was drunk), and
seven evidentiary ideas that favored the defendant (implying that the defendant was not drunk). Control participants read these fourteen evidentiary ideas in their pallid, ordinary form.
Other participants read either a vivid version of either the prosecutor’s evidence or the defendant’s evidence. Vividness was manipulated
by varying several aspects of the evidence without altering its probative
value.254 As Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, employing action verbs, visual
cues, sense-based language, irrelevant and expansive descriptors, and
personalized and affective descriptors made evidence more vivid. Importantly, all vividness manipulations were designed to make irrelevant
aspects of the evidence more vivid. As a precaution, additional measures
were taken to ensure that increasing the vividness of the evidence did not
increase its probative value.255
Table 1 showcases the prosecution’s evidence in both ordinary and
vivid form. An example of an ordinary version of the prosecution’s evidence is the statement: “On the way out the door, the defendant knocked
against a serving table, knocking a salsa bowl to the floor.” The vivid
version of this evidence adds color imagery and more colorful action
verbs to that same evidentiary statement: “On his way out the door, the
defendant staggered against a serving table, knocking over a bowl of
salsa which splattered all over the white carpet.”
Similarly, Table 2 showcases the defendant’s ordinary and vivid evidence. An ordinary version of the defense’s evidence read: “The cement
truck owner admitted under cross-examination that his truck is difficult
to see at night because it is gray in color.” The vivid version of this
evidence included an irrelevant but memorable exchange between the
252

See supra Part III.A.
Cf. Reyes et al., supra note 42, at 4 (employing “relatively slight” vividness manipulation to avoid conflating argument availability with probative value).
254 See generally id.
255 See infra notes 269–272 and accompanying text. Pretesting was performed to ensure
the manipulations worked as expected and the probative value of the vivid and pallid evidence
was the same. See infra Section III.C for a complete discussion.
253
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truck driver and the cross-examining defense attorney: “The owner said
his trucks might be difficult to see at night because they are gray, which
‘hides the dirt,’ and then said, ‘What—should they be pink?’”
Participants whose trial scenario included vivid prosecution evidence also included ordinary defense evidence and vice versa. It was
expected that, absent procedures to combat the vividness bias, participants’ judgments of the defendant’s guilt would be affected by whether
their trial scenario contained vivid prosecution or vivid defense evidence:256 participants exposed to vivid prosecution evidence would judge
the defendant to be drunker than would participants exposed to vivid
defense evidence (despite the fact that no legally relevant additional information was provided in the vivid scenario).

256 Cf. Reyes et al., supra note 42, at 3 (“[T]he more vivid arguments should be more
available for recall and hence they should dominate the nonvivid counterarguments in determining guilt judgment.”).
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TABLE 1: Prosecution’s Evidence
Ordinary Form
On the way out the door, the defendant knocked against a serving
table, knocking a salsa bowl to the
floor.

Vivid Form
On his way out the door, the defendant staggered against a serving
table, knocking over a bowl of salsa
which splattered all over the white
carpet.

A coworker noticed that early in the
evening, the defendant loudly and
enthusiastically asked for a strong
drink from the bartender.

At seven p.m., a coworker noticed
the defendant shout, “Make it a
double!” to the bartender, and then
remark, “Let’s get this party
started!”

A coworker noted that the defendant, who knew her well, kept calling her by the wrong name as the
night wore on.

As the night wore on, the defendant
repeatedly began referring to a
coworker, whom the defendant had
known for years, as “Brenda”
instead of “Linda.”

The defendant performed a wellknown karaoke song that night and
could not remember some of the
words.

The defendant performed Journey’s
Don’t Stop Believin’ on karaoke
that night, but could not remember
the refrain.

The defendant became louder as the
night progressed, even when talking to other partygoers to whom the
defendant was standing closely.

The defendant became louder as the
night progressed, and partygoers
conversing with the defendant had
to lean away because of the defendant’s volume.

The stop sign at the intersection
where the accident occurred was
clearly visible from the road.

The stop sign at the intersection
where the accident occurred had a
reflective coating, making it clearly
visible from the road.

The defendant had trouble putting
the key into the lock on the car
door, which the defendant accidentally scratched.

The defendant kept missing the
lock on his car door when trying to
put the key in the lock. Only after
putting a two-inch scratch in the
door did the defendant succeed.
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TABLE 2: Defense’s Evidence
Ordinary Form
The cement truck owner admitted
under cross-examination that his
truck is difficult to see at night
because it is gray in color.

Vivid Form
The cement truck owner said his
trucks might be difficult to see at
night because they are gray, which
“hides the dirt,” and then said,
“What? Should they be pink?”

Early on in the evening, coworkers
noticed that the defendant had
stopped drinking.

After eight p.m., coworkers had
noticed the defendant’s hand conspicuously without a drink, which
led to chiding from coworkers that
the defendant was a teetotaler.

The defendant is known to be gregarious by nature, even when not
drinking.

The defendant is a naturally loud
and gregarious person, often known
as the life of the party when not
drinking.

Because of a storm the night
before, a tree branch was partially
obstructing the view of the intersection’s stop signs from the road.

After a bad lightning storm the
night before, a branch split from a
tree and partially obstructed the
view of the intersection’s stop signs
from the road.

The cement truck had been speeding slightly as it approached the
intersection. The defendant was
not speeding.

The cement truck had been traveling seven miles per hour above the
speed limit as it approached the
intersection. The defendant had
been traveling at two miles per hour
below the speed limit.

The defendant won a limbo competition that night which required
agility and concentration.

The defendant defeated his officemates in a limbo competition that
night by carefully and methodically
getting underneath the bar without
touching it.

The defendant was seen repeatedly
rejecting drinks his boss had
offered to him.

The defendant refused to drink
shots of whisky with his boss
despite the boss’s repeated
requests.

b) Note Taking
In addition to reading either vivid prosecution evidence, vivid defense evidence, or ordinary versions of both, participants were split into
two groups: those permitted to take notes and those who were not. Notetaking jurors were provided a blank 8.5-inch by 11-inch sheet of paper to
write down anything they thought would help them evaluate the defendant’s guilt. Based on prior note-taking research, it was expected that
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participants who took notes would record what they deemed to be the
“most important” pieces of evidence from the trial.257 It was further hypothesized that jurors would deem the vivid evidence more important
than ordinary evidence. Thus, it was expected that jurors disproportionately would record vivid evidence in their notes at the expense of probative, but ordinary, evidence.
c) Time Delay
Half of all study participants were asked to judge the defendant’s
guilt and recall the prosecution and defense evidence immediately after
reading the trial summary. The other participants judged the defendant’s
guilt and recalled the trial evidence forty-eight hours after reading the
trial scenario. It was hypothesized that on return, study participants
would better remember the vivid information (as opposed to the pallid
information), and this differential recall would influence their verdicts of
the defendant’s guilt. Thus, the vividness bias would be exacerbated by
the passage of time; participants who read vivid prosecution evidence
and waited forty-eight hours to make their guilt judgments would judge
the defendant as significantly drunker than those who read vivid defense
evidence.258
In sum, the hypotheses for this experimental study are as follows:
(1) Vivid evidence will bias mock jurors in the direction
of the vivid evidence, and thus toward the party who
puts forth the vivid evidence—whether that is the
prosecutor or defendant.
(2) The vividness bias will influence judgments because
mock jurors will remember vivid information better
than ordinary information; thus, the vividness bias
will be most evident when participants wait fortyeight hours to judge the defendant’s drunkenness.
(3) Most importantly, mock jurors’ ability to take notes
will not alleviate this bias; rather, note-taking jurors
likely will take notes on the most vivid evidence, exacerbating the vividness bias. Thus, note-taking jurors exposed to vivid evidence and a time delay
before rendering their judgments will be most affected by the vividness bias.
257

Kiewra et al., supra note 123, at 120.
Similarly, those who read vivid defense evidence and waited forty-eight hours to make
their guilt judgments would judge the defendant as significantly less drunk than would those
participants who read vivid prosecution evidence.
258
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C. Results
The experimental results supported each of the above hypotheses.259
In sum, the experimental results revealed a statistically significant main
effect of the vividness of the evidence;260 a statistically significant interaction between vividly presented evidence and jurors’ use of notes;261 a
statistically significant interaction between vividly presented evidence
and the passage of time;262 and a statistically significant interaction
among vividly presented evidence, jurors’ use of notes, and the passage
of time.263 Put simply, vividly presented information biased mock jurors
in favor of the party that presented the vivid evidence.264 Further, this
effect was magnified when mock jurors were allowed to take notes while
reading the trial scenario and when jurors waited forty-eight hours to
render their verdicts.265 These results are explained in more detail below. The first set of analyses and Table 3 compare the questionnaire
responses from non note-takers only. The second set of analyses and
Table 4 compare the questionnaire responses from note-takers. Table 5
then compares the responses from note-takers and non note-takers.266
At the outset, several manipulation checks were performed to ensure
the experiment accurately manipulated the vividness of the evidence. In
pretests,267 participants judged the vivid versions of the evidence as more
concrete and imagery-provoking.268 These findings assure us that the
more vivid descriptions of the evidence were, in fact, perceived by mock
259 Data were analyzed using (1) a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which provides a statistical test of whether the means of several groups are equal, and (2) unpaired t-tests
and post-hoc Tukey-Kramer tests for detecting true differences in sample means. ANOVA
results are represented by an F-statistic, and t-tests are represented by a t-statistic. See generally LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 251, at 277–84 (explaining the ANOVA analysis). All means
are denoted by the abbreviation “M,” and all standard deviations are denoted by the abbreviation “SD.”
Differences are denoted as statistically significant in this Article if “the statistical test
used indicates that the likelihood that the difference would occur by chance is less than 5%
(reported by the p-value as p < 0.05).” A difference is marginally significant if “the likelihood
of such a difference occurring by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%.” Robbennolt,
supra note 131, at 485 n.117 (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING
MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed. 1989)).
260 F(2, 60) = 36.98, p < .001.
261 F(2, 60) = 6.26, p = .003.
262 F(2, 60) = 25.82, p < .001.
263 F(2, 60) = 5.72, p = .005.
264 See infra Tables 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
265 See infra Table 5 and accompanying text.
266 As noted earlier, the experiment reported in this Article contains a 3 (vividness) x 2
(note-taking) x 2 (time) between-subjects factorial design, which creates twelve different subgroups of experimental participants. For simplicity, experimental results are displayed in a
series of 3 x 2 charts and graphs. See infra Tables 3, 4, and 5.
267 The responses from these pretest participants were not included in the analysis below
for the main experiment.
268 All t-statistics were greater than 2.0 and all p-values were less than 0.05.
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jurors as more vivid during the experiment. More importantly, pretest
participants rated the probative values of the vivid and pallid versions of
each evidentiary idea as statistically equal.269 This manipulation check
eliminates the probative value of the evidence as a confounding variable;
this increases confidence that any differences in mock juror judgments of
the defendant’s guilt are due to vividness, note-taking, and time lapse—
not probative value.270
I now turn to the results of the main experiment. The first set of
analyses compares the responses of non note-takers who filled out the
questionnaire immediately after reading the trial scenario with those who
filled it out forty-eight hours later.
In sum, the results, which appear in Table 3, replicate those of the
Reyes study.271 As expected, there was no vividness effect in any of the
experimental conditions when participants rated the defendant’s drunkenness and recalled trial facts immediately after they read the trial scenario.272 This is not surprising. Consistent with Nisbett and Ross’s
hypothesis and with Reyes and his colleagues’ experimental data, the
vividness effect is a product of differential recall of vivid information in
memory. When participants immediately gave their guilt judgments and
immediately recalled trial information, they did not need to rely as heavily on their memories.
TABLE 3: Judgments of Non Note-Takers

Vivid Prosecution

Drunkenness Ratings
Immediate Judgment
Delayed Judgment
3.50a
4.50b
a
(0.84)
(0.55)a

Vivid Defense

3.41a
(0.66)

2.50c
(0.55)

Control

4.00ab
(0.89)

3.83ab
(0.75)

Note. Means sharing a common superscript are not statistically different at á = 0.05 according to
the Tukey-Kramer procedure. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.

269

All t-statistics were greater than 2.0 and all p-values were less than 0.05.
For example, without knowing that the probative values for the vivid evidence were
rated statistically the same as the probative values for the pallid evidence, some legitimately
might wonder whether substituting words and phrases like “stagger” for “knock” and “a
double” for “strong drink” might increase the probative value of the evidence. The data collected from pretest participants shows that concern is unwarranted.
271 F(2, 30) = 7.76; p = 0.002 (main effect of the vividness presented); F(2,30) = 5.40, p =
.01 (interaction between vividness of the evidence and passage of time). See also Reyes et al.,
supra note 42, at 8–11 (discussing the results of the experiment).
272 F < 1.00; p > .05.
270
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FIGURE 1
Drunkenness Ratings
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However, the vividness effect did appear when participants waited
forty-eight hours to fill out the questionnaires. The participants who read
a trial scenario that contained vivid prosecution evidence and waited for
two days to render their verdicts judged that the defendant was drunker
than did those who did not wait to give their judgments.273 They also
found the defendant drunker than did those who read vivid defense evidence.274 In addition, they remembered a higher proportion of prosecution evidence compared to other participants who read vivid defense
evidence and waited forty-eight hours to give their judgments.275
We find a similar vividness effect when examining the guilt ratings
from subjects who read vivid defense evidence and waited two days to
fill out the questionnaires. These participants rated the defendant as significantly less drunk than did those who read vivid defense evidence but
273 For non note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence and experienced a
time delay, M = 4.50, SD = 0.55; for non note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution
evidence and did not experience a time delay, M = 3.50, SD = 0.84, t = 2.44, p = .035. Planned
t-test comparisons were accompanied by Tukey-Kramer analyses to stabilize the familywise
error rate and avoid false positives.
274 For non note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence and experienced a
time delay, M = 4.50, SD = 0.55; for non note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence
and experienced a time delay, M = 2.50, SD = 0.55, t = 6.30, p < .001.
275 t = 2.92; p = 0.0617 (marginally significant). This variable was measured by performing a content analysis of each participant’s written recall of the presented evidence. The interrater reliability was 0.95. Differences in opinion, if any, were resolved via conference.
For each participant, I then calculated a ratio of the number of prosecution arguments
they remembered to the total number of arguments, both prosecution and defense ones, they
remembered. The ratio can be denoted as P / (P + D).
Further, I calculated the proportion of participants whose memory of the prosecution’s
evidence exceeded their memory of the defense’s evidence. A greater proportion of participants who read vivid prosecution evidence recalled more of the prosecution’s evidence (t =
2.14; p = 0.0759, which is marginally significant). Likewise, a greater proportion of participants who read vivid defense evidence recalled more of the defense’s evidence (t = 4.07; p <
0.01). In sum, vivid evidence was more memorable.
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gave their ratings immediately.276 They found the defendant less drunk
than did those who read vivid prosecution evidence.277 They also recalled a higher proportion of defense evidence than did other participants
who waited to give their judgments.278
In sum, the vividness effect appeared as hypothesized. When participants had to rely more on their memories to judge the defendant’s
guilt, those judgments were influenced by the facts presented to them
more vividly. The vividly presented information was also more accessible in these participants’ memories.
The second set of analyses examines what effect jury note-taking
has on the vividness bias.279 The results appear in Table 4. As hypothesized, note-taking exacerbated the effect of vivid evidence on mock jurors who waited to rate the defendant’s drunkenness.280 The guilt
judgments from note takers who gave their judgments immediately did
not significantly differ regardless of trial scenario presented—vivid prosecution, vivid defense, or pallid evidence.281 Because these participants
immediately recalled trial information, they did not need to rely as heavily on their memories or notes. Accordingly, these participants did not
differ with respect to the amount of information they recalled from the
trial or the proportion of prosecution or defense evidence they
remembered.282

276 For non note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and experienced a time
delay, M = 2.50, SD = 0.55; for non note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and
did not experience a time delay, M = 3.41, SD = 0.66, t = 2.59, p = .027.
277 For non note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and experienced a time
delay, M = 2.50, SD = 0.55; for non note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence
and experienced a time delay, M = 4.50, SD = 0.55, t = 6.30, p < .001.
278 t = 2.92; p = 0.062 (marginally significant). I followed the same method as that in
note 275 to calculate defense evidence ratios. See supra note 275.
279 We might hypothesize that allowing jurors to take notes of all trial information would
eliminate the differential recall of vivid facts underlying the vividness bias. Accordingly, if
participants take note of all information presented at trial, vivid and pallid alike, than the
vividness bias should disappear. But we know from the empirical literature on note taking that
people tend to take notes on information they deem “important.” Thus, if more vividly
presented information is considered more “important” by jurors and note-taking affects their
memories regarding the facts, then allowing jurors to take notes will enhance the vividness
bias, which I hypothesized in this study.
280 F(2, 30) = 33.47, p < .001 (main effect of vividly presented evidence); F(2, 30) =
26.71, p < .001 (interaction between vividness of the evidence and passage of time).
281 F < 1.00; p > .05.
282 F < 1.00; p > .05.
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TABLE 4: Judgments of Note-Takers

Vivid Prosecution
Vivid Defense
Control

Drunkenness Ratings
Immediate Judgment
Delayed Judgment
a
3.50
6.50b
(1.05)
(0.55)
3.17a
(0.41) (0.52)

1.67c

3.67a
(0.82)

3.50a
(1.05)

Note. Means sharing a common superscript are not statistically different at á = 0.05 according to
the Tukey-Kramer procedure. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.

FIGURE 2
Drunkenness Ratings

7
6
5
4
6.5

3
2

3.5

1

Immediate
3.67 3.5

3.17

Delayed

1.67

0
Prosecution

Defense
Evidence Vividness

Control

However, the data from note-takers who waited forty-eight hours to
rate the defendant’s drunkenness is dramatically different. Allowing jurors to take notes did not alleviate the vividness bias. Note takers who
read vivid prosecution evidence rated the defendant as dramatically
drunker than did those who gave their ratings immediately.283 Moreover,
they rated the defendant as considerably drunker than did either those
who read vivid defense evidence284 or the control subjects.285
Further, a content analysis of their notes was performed to determine the proportion of vivid evidence the notes contained.286 The notes
283 For note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence and experienced a time
delay, M = 6.50, SD = 0.55; for note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence and
did not experience a time delay, M = 3.50, SD = 1.05, t = 6.20, p < .001.
284 For note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and experienced a time delay, M = 1.67, SD = 0.52, t = 15.63, p < .001.
285 For note-taking subjects who read pallid evidence and experienced a time delay, M =
3.50, SD = 1.05, t = 6.20, p < .001.
286 In this content analysis, several readers rated each participant’s notes for the amount
of evidence recorded about the trial. The inter-rater reliability was 0.95, and differences were
resolved via conference. See supra note 279.
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from these participants contained a greater proportion of vivid evidence
than did the notes from participants who read vivid defense evidence or
pallid evidence.287 Further, these participants’ memories for the evidence contained a greater proportion of vivid evidence.288
The opposite pattern of polarized guilt judgments occurred among
those who read vividly presented defense evidence. Those who read
vivid defense evidence and waited forty-eight hours rated the defendant
significantly less drunk than did those who did not wait to give their guilt
judgments,289 those who read vivid prosecution evidence,290 and those
who read pallid evidence.291 Thus, a very strong vividness effect was
evident among note-takers who waited forty-eight hours to fill out the
questionnaire about the trial.
Like their counterparts who read vivid prosecution evidence, notetakers who read vivid defense evidence recalled a greater proportion of
the vivid evidence than did other participants.292 Their notes also contained a greater proportion of the vivid defense evidence than did the
notes from control subjects or participants who read vivid prosecution
evidence.293
Note-taking did not alleviate the vividness bias, but did it actually
exacerbate it? Yes, as revealed by Table 5, which compares the drunkenness ratings for note-takers who gave delayed guilt judgments and non
note-takers who gave delayed guilt judgments. Recall that vivid evidence influenced both of these groups. Strikingly, note-takers gave even
more polarized ratings of the defendant’s guilt than did non note-takers.294 In other words, note-takers who read vivid prosecution evidence
rated the defendant significantly drunker than did non note-takers who
read the same vivid prosecution evidence.295 Their memory for the evidence also contained a greater proportion of (vivid) prosecution information than did the memories of non note-takers.296
287

t = 3.00; p < 0.05.
t = 19.25; p < 0.01.
289 For note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and experienced a time delay, M = 1.67, SD = 0.52; for note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence and did not
experience a time delay, M = 3.17, SD = 0.41, t = 5.55, p < .001.
290 For note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence and experienced a time
delay, M = 6.50, SD = 0.55, t = 15.63, p < .001.
291 For note-taking subjects who read pallid evidence and experienced a time delay, M =
3.50, SD = 1.05, t = 3.83, p = .003.
292 t = 19.25; p < 0.01.
293 t = 3.00; p < 0.05.
294 F(2, 30) = 74.29; p < .001 (main effect of the vividness of the evidence); F(2, 30) =
14.53, p < .001 (interaction between vividness of the evidence and jurors’ use of notes).
295 For note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence, M = 6.50, SD = 0.55;
for non note-taking subjects who read vivid prosecution evidence, M = 4.50, SD = 0.55, t =
6.30, p < .001.
296 t = 3.00; p < 0.05.
288
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TABLE 5: Comparison of Delayed Judgments
Drunkenness Ratings
Memory-Only Subjects

Note-Taking Subjects

a

Vivid Prosecution

4.50
(0.55)

6.50b
(0.55)

Vivid Defense

2.50c
(0.55)

1.67d
(0.52)

Control

3.83ae
(0.75)

3.50e
(1.05)

Note. Means sharing a common superscript are not statistically different at á = 0.05 according to
the Tukey-Kramer procedure. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.

FIGURE 3
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Note-takers who read vivid defense evidence and experienced a
time delay similarly gave more polarized judgments of the defendant’s
drunkenness. Specifically, note-takers who read vivid defense evidence
rated the defendant as significantly less drunk than did non note-takers
who read vivid defense evidence.297
Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that, far from
alleviating the effects of vivid evidence on jurors’ legal judgments, notetaking exacerbates the vividness bias. Note-taking exacerbates this bias
by drawing jurors’ attention to the vivid evidence and ensuring that this
vivid information is more readily accessible in their memories when they
decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant. This is true even when the
vividness has no probative value. This surprising finding has many implications for the American legal system.
297 For note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence, M = 1.67, SD = 0.52; for
non note-taking subjects who read vivid defense evidence, M = 2.50, SD = 0.55, t = 2.69, p =
0.023.
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OBJECTIONS

A. Implications
This experiment demonstrates that juror note-taking, an apparently
minor procedural issue typically left to the discretion of local courts, has
a hitherto unnoticed impact on substantive decision making. The general
theme throughout this Section is that there may be a dangerous and widespread mismatch between courts’ armchair behavioral predictions and
actual decision making. Additional research is desperately needed to resolve this situation.
The experiment reported in this Article yielded surprising results. It
provides evidence that contradicts the belief of empirical researchers that
allowing jurors to take notes during trial has, at least, no “harmful consequences.”298 It certainly challenges the prevailing legal view that presupposes that note-taking adds value to jury trials by improving memory
for facts and improving the accuracy of legal decisions.299 These results
raise two questions: Should jurors be permitted to take notes if doing so
can skew their legal judgments? More importantly, who should make
that decision: individual trial courts or other policy makers?
This study has significant implications regarding whether jurors
should be allowed to take notes during trials. Prior empirical evidence
has tepidly supported the view that note-taking can increase memory for
facts and improve legal judgments.300 The current experiment is the first
to find evidence that jury note-taking may have a potentially negative
impact on verdicts. Further research must be done to replicate these results and to determine the degree to which note-taking can exacerbate the
vividness bias on jurors’ legal decisions.
Assuming that the results from this experimental study are robust,
what should be done? Some might say “nothing.” The argument is a
practical one: because each party is incentivized to present the best case
possible to the trier of fact, each party will present its case vividly. As
one commentator has said, the vividness heuristic creates an incentive for
people to manipulate it to their own ends, and because this bias can be
exploited, potential beneficiaries will ensure that it is.301 Even if allowing jurors to take notes during trial proceedings exacerbates the vividness bias, it will be a zero-sum game. This argument has force, but
298

Penrod & Heuer, supra note 101, at 258.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–90.
300 See supra Part II.B. 2. The current experiment supports this finding, albeit not necessarily in a positive manner. Note-taking did increase jurors’ memory for facts. However, it
increased their memory for vividly presented facts at the expense of their memory for pallid
facts. See supra Part III.
301 Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 74 (2006).
299
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there are two responses: one theoretical and one practical. In terms of
trial practice, it is not always clear that each side has the resources to
present the most vivid case possible to the jury. For example, prior research indicates that vividly presented visual aids like photographs and
videotapes can bias jurors by lowering their threshold to convict a defendant in a criminal case,302 making conviction more likely.303 Prosecutors
may have greater financial resources to present this potentially biasing
demonstrative evidence to a jury.304 Moreover, the practical reality of
criminal trials is that defendants often do not present a case at all to the
factfinder, which may further exacerbate the effects of the vividness bias.
Moreover, recognizing that note-taking is just one of many local
procedural rules—which are heterogeneous and can vary from judge to
judge within a given jurisdiction—and assuming that empirical evidence
indicates that a particular local procedural rule impairs procedural due
process, who should make the decision whether to ban the practice or
not? Should it be the decision of individual judges to examine the research and decide for themselves whether to ban the practice in their
courtrooms? Or should higher courts or legislative bodies make these
pronouncements? To the extent these procedural practices implicate
transparency, equity, or accuracy, it appears that uniform guidelines, either to ban the procedure, allow it, or modify it, are necessary. Legislatures or rules committees seem the most likely choice to make such
recommendations, given their informational and resource advantages
over the trial and appellate courts.
Others might argue that requiring legislative bodies or rules committees to examine these matters will place too great a burden on them.
Others might further argue that the trial court is in the best position to
determine whether certain local trial procedures are appropriate for any
particular jury. These points are well taken, but they ignore the force of
the empirical evidence. If a particular local rule or practice is empirically shown to have negative systematic effects, it is difficult to imagine
how a judge would accurately determine that, in any particular case, the
potential negative effects will be avoided. And the extent to which individual judges may disagree whether to employ that procedural rule in
302 A conviction resulting from a “clear and convincing” standard of guilt instead of a
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of guilt would violate a defendant’s due process rights.
See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to convict); cf. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1990) (finding reversible error where jurors
were instructed to convict the defendant unless they have “such doubt as would give rise to
grave uncertainty”—an instruction requiring a lesser degree of certainty of guilt to convict
than the reasonable-doubt standard).
303 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
304 Similarly, in civil cases, a party with greater financial resources (for example, a large
corporation) might also be able to present a more vivid case to a trier of fact.
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any particular instance only underscores the need for uniformity. The
empirical data have not shown the need for such measures yet, with respect to jury-note taking or any other local procedural rule, but more
research—and greater academic discussion of these rules—is necessary.
The results from this experiment raise due process concerns for litigants regarding the transparency, equity, and accuracy of legal decisionmaking. It may be unremarkable to argue that judicial decisions should
be transparent—that is, it should be clear from the evidence how a trier
of fact reached its ultimate decision. Yet, legal decisions are not transparent if they are based on factors other than the evidence, particularly
factors that are outside of the decision maker’s conscious awareness.
Moreover, with some caveats, we legitimately expect that presenting the same evidence will lead to the same legal decision regardless of
the characteristics of the fact finder. It should trouble us if two similarly
situated plaintiffs present identical evidence yet receive different verdicts
from two different tribunals, particularly if one factfinder was permitted
to take notes while the other was not. To the extent that note-taking
exacerbates the vividness bias, and given that some judges allow notetaking while others do not, this raises serious concerns regarding the equitable treatment of litigants under the law.
The experimental results also have implications for the accuracy of
legal decision-making. In the experiment presented in this Article, the
probative value of the vividly presented evidence did not differ from the
probative value of its pallid counterpart, yet it had a disproportionate
effect on judgments of the defendant’s guilt. We could imagine scenarios in which admissible evidence with low probative value contains a
high potential for subconscious bias.305 To the extent such lowly probative evidence has a disproportionate impact on legal judgments, the accuracy of those judgments may suffer.
These procedural due process concerns—transparency, equity, and
accuracy—are not implicated only with respect to jury note-taking.
Judges have broad discretion to implement a myriad of other jury trial
innovations.306 These innovations might also raise these concerns. For
305 If the bias is subconscious, it is not clear that such evidence would be excluded by a
trial judge under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which requires the exclusion of evidence
whose probative value is outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. FED. R. EVID. 403.
306 For example, the Michigan Supreme Court recently issued a press release and order
allowing trial judges to experiment with several innovations, including summing up the evidence for the jury, allowing jurors to take notes, and allowing jurors to discuss the evidence
before deliberations commence. See New Jury Reform Rules Aimed at Greater Engagement
by Jurors, available at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Press/PR06-29-11Jury%20Reform.pdf (permitting jurors, with the judge’s permission, to submit questions to witnesses
through the judge, take notes during trial, discuss evidence among themselves in the jury room
during trial recess, be provided with written summaries of depositions, and provide the judge
with a list of issues that divide or confuse them) (last visited October 18, 2011); see also Order
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example, allowing attorneys to sum up evidence at a jury trial’s interim
points may invite framing effects, despite a judge’s instructions to the
jury that they should not treat the attorney’s summation as evidence.307
These framing effects might serve as a filter that biases how jurors view
the rest of the evidence in the case. This may lead to unclear, inconsistent, and inaccurate judgments by fact finders who are exposed to this
practice.
Similarly, allowing jurors to discuss the case before officially deliberating might also raise these procedural due process concerns. To the
extent premature discussions allow jurors to decide the outcome of the
trial, a juror could fall prey to the confirmation bias, where the juror
filters the remaining evidence presented to her in search of evidence that
matches her view of the case.308 If the practice spreads to enough jurors
early in the trial, it could lead to groupthink, a phenomenon in which
people conform more quickly to a majority view without weighing all the
facts, especially those contradicting the majority opinion.309 This practice also raises the risk of opaque, inequitable, and incorrect legal
judgments.
In sum, the mismatch between judicial attitudes toward note-taking
and the empirical reality of note-taking is not an isolated issue. It is just
one example of a local procedural rule that has ripple effects that can be
felt throughout the legal system in the form of biased decisions by legal
fact finders. Additional research is necessary to determine how to stem
this tide.

(Mich. June 29, 2011) (amending Michigan Court Rules 2.512, 2.513, 2.514, 2.515, 2.516, and
6.414), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/200519_06-29-11_order.pdf (last visited October 18, 2011) [hereinafter Michigan Supreme Court
Order].
Judge Hathaway dissented from the Order. See Michigan Supreme Court Order, supra
(Hathaway, J. dissenting) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of public comments . . . oppose most
of these procedures. Those comments were submitted by a broad spectrum of the legal community, and reflect a host of valid, practical and legal issues that have not been resolved . . . .
[T]here is inadequate objective evidence establishing that many of these so-called ‘reforms’
will result in any substantial improvement in the jury trial system.”).
307 These limiting instructions are notoriously ineffective as an empirical matter. See,
e.g., Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions:
Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 703 (2000) (reviewing the literature and noting that limiting instructions often are ineffective because of
psychological processes like belief perseverance, the hindsight bias, reactance theory, and the
theory of ironic processes of mental control).
308 See P. C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 139 (1960).
309 See IRVING L. JANIS., GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES 174–75 (Houghton Mifflin Co.) (2d ed. 1982).
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B. Objections
The experimental results reported in this Article provide counterintuitive evidence that local procedural rules can affect substantive legal
outcomes, and not always for the better. Discussed above, these results
have numerous due process implications. But experimental results
should be interpreted with caution, and the results reported in this Article
are no exception.
Laboratory experiments can be criticized for lacking external validity. This may be because the stakes in a laboratory experiment are significantly lower than the stakes in an actual trial.310 Jurors may behave
differently when they have the fate of a real defendant in their hands.
For example, if made aware of them, jurors may be more motivated to
overcome framing effects and biases, like the vividness bias.311 In an
ideal experiment, study participants would watch a live trial in an actual
courtroom and deliberate before providing data to the experimenters. A
researcher with infinite time and funds might be able to replicate a real
trial with actors playing the parts of the plaintiff, defendant, witnesses,
judges, and attorneys. But there is no ethical way to place study participants under the belief that their judgments might truly affect the freedom
or the financial situation of an actual defendant.312
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that these limitations
prevent experimental studies from teaching us anything valuable about
juror behavior.313 Although the possibility that the exacerbation of the
vividness bias observed in this experiment would disappear in a realworld setting cannot be ruled out, there is evidence that results obtained
in hypothetical studies, like the robust effects obtained in this study, generally reflect reality.314 In fact, “[a] misplaced preoccupation with external validity can lead us to dismiss useful research.”315
Similarly, in an ideal experiment, jurors would deliberate with other
jurors before rendering their verdicts, as they would in a real trial setting.
Of course, the reality of experimental testing is that additional costs, in
terms of time and resources, make this difficult. This itself should not
310 See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 132, at 232 (citing WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT (1984)).
311 See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, supra
note 5, at 1226–31 (demonstrating that trial judges can overcome biases, to an extent, when
they are aware of the biases and motivated to avoid them).
312 Many research universities have Institutional Review Boards designed specifically to
protect human subjects from unethical experimenter behavior. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, http://irb.illinois.edu/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2011). See generally 45 C.F.R. 46 (1985) (regulating human subjects research).
313 Kelman et al., supra note 27, at 73.
314 Id.
315 Douglas G. Mook, In Defense of External Invalidity, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 379, 379
(1983).
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lead us to minimize experimental findings that focus on the individual
juror. In their seminal book on the American jury, Kalven and Zeisel
demonstrated that the best predictor of the outcome of a jury deliberation
is the initial judgments of the individual jurors before the deliberation
begins.316 According to Kalven and Zeisel, approximately 90% of the
time, final jury votes after deliberation will match the individual judgments of those jurors in the majority before the deliberation.317 Moreover, research on panel effects suggests that individual judgments become
more polarized after deliberation;318 thus, the results from this experiment may actually understate the vividness bias in real trials. Further, it
is not obvious that judges, who often take notes during trials, are unaffected by the vividness bias.319 Moreover, bench trials do not require
judges to deliberate before rendering their verdicts.320
Some examining the experimental results reported in this Article
may wonder how much the vividness bias matters. Past empirical research demonstrates that the greatest predictor of jury verdicts is the
strength of the evidence presented.321 If this is true, then the concern that
the vividness effect can systematically bias juror verdicts—and that notetaking appears to exacerbate this bias—may be diluted by other considerations. There are several responses to this concern. Much of what we
know about legal rules stems not from an empirical examination of how
these rules operate, but from intuitive hunches.322 Sometimes, however,
hunches are wrong. Empirical scholarship can be a powerful tool in illuminating instances where that is the case. Therefore, increased knowledge of how these rules affect legal judgments is valuable in itself.
Putting this point aside, there are other reasons that the vividness
bias, and its exacerbation through jury note-taking, might be important to
policy makers and practitioners. A wealth of empirical research demon316 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 488 (1966). This is true
for many reasons, one of which is the fact that the decisions of groups tend to “polarize”
toward the majority view. See Jerry K. Palmer & James M. Loveland, The Influence of Group
Discussion on Performance Judgments: Rating Accuracy, Contrast Effects, and Halo, 142 J.
PSYCH.: INTERDISCIPLINARY & APPLIED 117 (2008). This topic—how note-taking is affected
by group deliberation processes—is ripe for further study.
317 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 313, at 488.
318 Palmer & Loveland, supra note 313, at 117.
319 See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, supra
note 4, at 1195 (finding that judges harbor the same implicit biases, as do jurors, that affect
their judgment; nonetheless, judges can compensate for these biases if they are sufficiently
motivated).
320 Id.
321 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 339 (2007).
322 See, e.g., William C. Thompson & Maithilee K. Pathak, Empirical Study of Hearsay
Rules: Bridging the Gap Between Psychology and Law, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 456,
456–57 (1999) (“The legal rules regarding hearsay rest heavily on ‘empirical hunches’ that
could usefully be evaluated through psychological research.”).
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strates that so-called extralegal factors can affect jury judgments when
the strength of the evidence is at the margins.323 In other words, it is
likely that when the evidence is not overwhelming—when it is either at
the line of reasonable doubt, clear and convincing, or a preponderance—
extralegal factors and bias might play a prominent role in jury decisionmaking.324 Moreover, the experiment reported in this Article supports
the view that framing effects and biases may shape how the jury perceives the strength of the evidence in the first place. If this is the case,
then research on biases, framing effects, and local procedural rules that
might enhance them, deserves serious continued study.
Finally, some might wonder whether local procedural rules and the
vividness bias are worth continued study if the effects are not institutionally systematic. For example, it might be said that it is not always the
case that a prosecutor will put forth vivid evidence while a defendant will
not (or vice versa). Accordingly, although note-taking jurors’ decisions
will be biased in the direction of the vivid evidence, the effect on trial
outcomes is not always the same: it will not always favor the plaintiff or
prosecutor and it will not always favor the defendant. Moreover, the
vividness bias in the courtroom might be a zero-sum game; for example,
both sides may present their evidence as vividly as possible and the vividness of one party’s evidence would offset the vividness of the other
party’s evidence. These are fair points, but they underline exactly why
this topic is important and why further research is necessary. As discussed in the prior section, resource disparities (like having the funds to
present vivid images of one’s case to a jury) might be institutional, particularly in the criminal context. Moreover, scholars of legal ethics
might be interested in this research when investigating whether attorneys
should or should not attempt to use heuristics that might bias juries on
behalf of their clients. More research must be done to understand fully
the nature of this bias and the ways in which local procedural rules, both
formal and informal, interact with it. The research reported in this Article is a first step down that path.
323

See CHRISTINE L. RUVA, HOW PRETRIAL PUBLICITY AFFECTS JUROR DECISION MAKING
MEMORY (2010) (pretrial publicity affects views of the evidence); J. Kevin Barge et al.,
The Effects of Nonverbal Communication and Gender on Impression Formation in Opening
Statements, 54 S. COMM. J. 330, 331 (1989) (finding an attorney’s nonverbal cues, including
pauses and stuttering, affect jurors’ views of the evidence against his client); Bonnie Erickson
et al., Speech Style and Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Effects of “Powerful”
and “Powerless” Speech, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCH. 266 (1978) (demonstrating that
speech style of defendant’s attorney affects views of evidence against the defendant); Harry
Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 410 (1975)
(demonstrating that characteristics of the defendant herself affects jurors’ views of the
evidence).
324 See RUVA, supra note 320.
AND
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps policy makers do not care about local procedural rules.
This Article demonstrates that they should. The results of the experiment
presented in this Article underscore the need for a thorough behavioral
analysis of legal rules. This is true particularly with respect to local procedural rules, which are heterogeneous but can have systematic substantive effects on legal outcomes. The experiment reported in this Article
demonstrates that a local rule, like allowing jurors to take notes during
trial, exacerbates behavioral framing effects in significant, systematic
ways. These experimental findings run counter to conventional legal
wisdom about juror note-taking and have implications for the legal system as a whole. Concerns about the effects of these local procedural
rules on the transparency, equity, and accuracy of juror decision-making
necessitates further empirical research and discussion by legal academics
about the efficacy and systematic consequences of these rules.
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